38 Ill. App. 3d 35 - Welsh v. Welsh’s Empirical Analysis
1976
Citation profile
32 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently April 2021 · most notably 57 Ill. App. 3d 578 - Gasperini v. Gasperini (1978), 96 Ill. App. 3d 1108 - In Re Marriage of Brophy (1981)
32 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 62 Ill. 2d 483 - Leader v. Cullerton · 22 Ill. App. 3d 1045 - Kaufman v. Kaufman · 54 Ill. 2d 580 - Creel v. Industrial Commission · 59 Ill. App. 2d 354 - Richheimer v. Richheimer · 109 Ill. App. 2d 342 - Gibson v. Healy Bros. & Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The matter of fixing attorney’s fees is one of the few areas in which a trial judge may ‘rely on the pleadings, affidavits on file and his own experience * * *.' (Kaufman v. Kaufman (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1051 , 318 N.E.2d 282 .) ‘It has been the rule in this state for many years that courts will not be bound by the opinion of attorneys as to what constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees. The courts may use the knowledge they have acquired in the discharge of professional duties as to the value of legal services rendered.’ (Richheimer v. Richheimer (1965) 59 Ill. App. 2d 354, 365 , 208 N.E.2d 346 .) In reviewing the record before us we are obliged to consider the discretionary function of the trial court, the testimony before us and the entire record of the proceedings, all in the light of our own knowledge and experience in this type of matter.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““It is our considered opinion that the attorney’s fees allowed by the court in this case are higher than they should reasonably have been. The subject matter of the case did involve matters of significance or importance as does virtually every case, particularly from the point of view of the litigants. In addition, in this case, as in every piece of litigation, the lawyers bear a high degree of responsibility. In our opinion, the standing in the legal profession and the skill of counsel before us in this case are of the highest order. However, the time and labor necessarily involved in representing the plaintiff in the case before us does not reasonably justify the fees granted. * * * If these facts, apparent from the proceedings themselves, were the only matters before us, the fee allowed by the court would appear excessive. We also have before us the testimony of a highly qualified expert and the narrative testimony of counsel for plaintiff. In our opinion, an important element is lacking in both of these sources. From neither one can we obtain more definite information as to the time spent which is material in determining the reasonable amount of the fee. Time spent upon the case is necessarily an important element. We are not dealing here with a situation in which the amount of a fund can be used as a helpful guideline in fixing the amount of fees. (Compare Leader v. Cullerton (1974), 25 Ill. App. 3d 216 , 323 N.E.2d 11 , as modified by Leader v. Cullerton (1975), 62 Ill.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.