38 Md. App. 243 - Moore v. Presnell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Appellee, as we have stated, successfully raised a jury question through the testimony of Leon Anderson, who, driving his automobile behind Mrs. Presnell’s car, said that she, immediately prior to the impact, appeared as if she “just passed out.” The evidence clearly established that Mrs. Presnell did not react, when confronted with an imminent collision, as a conscious person would. She made no attempt to avert the accident, and there was no visible braking action. The medical history of Mrs. Presnell revealed that she was not an unlikely candidate for sudden lapses of consciousness. She had a history of cardiovascular disease and hypertension that could have caused her to “black out.” Examination of the contents of her purse, as we have seen, disclosed three vials of medicine, one of which contained “Aldomet.” The only medical testimony with respect to “Aldomet” was that it was “a blood pressure medicine.” That evidence, standing alone, as it did, was obviously insufficient in the minds of the jurors to outweigh the theory of the sudden, unexpected loss of consciousness. Mrs. Presnell had no apparent history of fainting spells, nor does the fact that she was receiving medication for hypertension make her loss of consciousness foreseeable. In sum, we think the evidence of the sudden, unexpected loss of consciousness was sufficient to entitle the jury to find as a fact that the automobile collision was the result of such a loss of consciousness, and that Mrs. Presnell’s estat”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 217 Md. App. 626 - Cooper v. Singleton

2. “According to the overwhelming weight of authority, where the driver of a motor vehicle suddenly and unforeseeably becomes physically or msntally incapacitated, he is not liable for injury resulting from the operation of the vehicle while so incapacitated. An exception to the general rule exists where a person knows that he is suffering from an illness which will likely cause his loss of consciousness. Where, as here, a prima facie case of negligence has been established by the plaintiff, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that a sudden illness or attack occurred, and that it could not have been anticipated. The rationale behind the defense of unanticipated unconsciousness is that the driver was suddenly deprived of his senses by “blacking out” so that he could not comprehend the nature and quality of his act, and thusly, is not responsible therefor.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 217 Md. App. 626 - Cooper v. Singleton

3. “The operator of a motor vehicle is not ordinarily chargeable with negligence because he becomes suddenly stricken by a fainting spell or loses consciousness from an unforeseen cause, and is unable to control the vehicle. In other words, fainting or momentary loss of consciousness while driving is a complete defense to an action based on negligence if such loss of consciousness was not foreseeable. [[Image here]] If the operator of a motor vehicle knows that he [or she] is subject to attacks in the course of which he [or she] is likely to lose consciousness, such a loss of consciousness does not constitute a defense in an action brought by a person injured as a result of the operator’s conduct.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McCall v. Wilder