Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) that he requested the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the [S]tate is bound to release the information whether requested or not), (2) that the State suppressed the information, (3) that the information was favorable to the defendant, and (4) that the information was material.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tommy Nunley v. State of Tennessee · Gdongalay P. Berry v. State of Tennessee

2. “[The] touchstone of materiality is a “reasonable probability” of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gdongalay P. Berry v. State of Tennessee · State of Tennessee v. Noura Jackson

3. “Evidence is deemed to be material when 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ' " Id. at 58 (quoting State v. Edgin , 902 S.W.2d 387 , 390 (Tenn. 1995) ) (emphasis added); see also Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263 , 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (stating the same). "[A] reviewing court must determine whether the defendant has shown that 'the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence of the verdict.' " Id. (quoting Irick v. State , 973 S.W.2d 643 , 657 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) ); see also Strickler , 527 U.S. at 281 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 (to establish a " Brady violation,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tommy Nunley v. State of Tennessee