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← 380 F.2d 433 - Parker v. Wideman

Parker v. Wideman’s Empirical Analysis

380 F.2d 433 · 1967

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
2
states following
January 2014
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently January 2014 · most notably Burger King Corp. v. Mason (1983), Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt (1967)

27 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

190196719701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1442

Relies on Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring · Brannen v. State of Florida · 159 So. 2d 641 - Shaw v. Puleo · 129 So. 2d 816 - Fullilove v. US Casualty Company of New York · Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “It would ... appear that a zero verdict in Florida may be sustained only where there is conflicting evidence as to whether the plaintiff was in fact injured ...”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"The difficulty with the appellee's approach is that Florida recognizes the `collateral source rule' which permits an injured party to recover expenses against the tortfeasor incurred as a result of the tortfeasor's negligence even though the injured party is compensated for those expenses by a collateral source. See, e.g. Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So.2d 457 (Fla.App.2d 1963). The appellee seeks to avoid the effect of the rule by arguing that it only precludes the defendant from introducing evidence of compensation from a collateral source, and that by introducing the evidence himself, the appellant waived the rule. Thus, the appellee continues, the jury was entitled to mitigate the damages by the monies received from a collateral source, as would be the case in those states which do not recognize the `collateral source' rule. We can not agree. "The appellee's position would render the `collateral source' rule a mere rule of evidence which is waivable by the injured party. But the fact of the matter is that under Florida law the rule is a substantive rule of law which applies whether or not evidence of collateral compensation is introduced. See Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman, 132 So.2d 460 (Fla.App.2d 1961); Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 876 (1959); Restatement of Torts, § 920, comment e, at 620."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Thus, while the tender of such evidence by the defendant may be excluded on objection by the plaintiff, the introduction of such evidence by the plaintiff does not bar him from recovering expenses necessitated by the tort-feasor's negligence, even though the expenses were met by monies received from a collateral source.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.