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← 380 F.3d 932 - Williams v. Bagley

Williams v. Bagley’s Empirical Analysis

380 F.3d 932 · 2004

Citation profile

119
cited by 119 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
November 2022
most recently cited

52 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 119 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2022 · most notably Lundgren v. Mitchell (2006), Souter v. Jones (2005)

52 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

720200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Batson v. Kentucky · Williams v. Taylor · Coleman v. Thompson · Gregg v. Georgia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 119 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “A habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default by demonstrating that “failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 722, 750 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The “fundamental miscarriage of justice” gateway is open to a petitioner who submits new evidence showing that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 , 106 S.Ct. 2639 , 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). “To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “guarantees a criminal defendant a trial by an impartial jury. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726-27 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). “In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 1639 , 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) The presence of even a single biased juror deprives a defendant of his right to an impartial jury. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.