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380 So. 2d 923

Lambeth v. State

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided August 17, 1979

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1979-08-17

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"[T]he Defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. Therefore, the burden of proof is on the State of Alabama, and the Defendant is always presumed to be innocent. The fact that he's been arrested and indicted and brought before the bar of justice does not create any presumption against him at all. But he comes into the court clothed with this presumption of innocence, and this presumption of innocence remains with him throughout the trial as an evidentiary fact in his favor. That is as a matter of evidence which must be considered by you until it is overcome by evidence, which proves his guilt to each and every one of you beyond a reasonable doubt, and to a moral certainty. As I've said, the burden is *Page 505 on the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty of any of the offenses charged in the indictment before you could convict him. "Now, you will want to know what a reasonable doubt is. When I say the State has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that does not mean that the State must prove the alleged crime beyond every imaginable or speculative doubt or beyond all possibility of mistake, because that would be impossible. A reasonable doubt means an actual substantial doubt. It could arise out of the testimony in the case or it could arise from a lack for which a reason can be assigned. And the expression 'to a moral certainty' means practically the same thing as beyond a reasonable doubt, bec”

quoted by 6 later decisions, including Stephens v. State, Owen v. State

“"[I]f by the oral charge or by other requested jury instructions, the jury is presented a discussion of the reasonable doubt standard as applied to the evidence in its totality, then the failure to give instructions similar to defendant's charges . . . is not error to reverse." Lambeth , 380 So.2d at 925 .”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 560 So. 2d 1107 - Sharpe v. State, 565 So. 2d 1274 - Barnes v. State

Relies on Cagle v. State · 37 Ala. App. 603 - Sanford v. State · Phillips v. Phillips

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1979-08-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently February 2014 · most notably Stewart v. State (1992), 548 So. 2d 459 - Acres v. State (1989)

32 state decisions

19019791980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1

¶2We granted the writ of certiorari in this case to review the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals which reversed defendant's conviction of assault and battery because the trial court refused to give his requested written charges one and five:

¶3"Defendant's Requested Charge No. 1

¶4 "I charge you, members of the jury, that any verdict you reach must be unanimous, and if any juror has a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt arising from all the evidence, a part of theevidence, or a lack of the evidence, then the defendant cannot be convicted." (Emphasis added).

¶5"Defendant's Requested Charge No. 5

¶6 "If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt growing out of the evidence or any part of it, you must acquit him." (Emphasis added).

¶7The appellate court found that defendant's requested charges one and five were not covered in other given written charges or in the court's oral charge. It reversed, citing Rakestraw v.State, 211 Ala. 535, 101 So. 181 (1924). We are compelled to reverse in light of King v. State, 356 So.2d 1220 (Ala. 1978) and Dillard v. State, 371 So.2d 947 (Ala. 1979).

¶8In this case, the trial court in its oral instruction to the jury, stated, among other things, the following:

¶9 "… Now, what does beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty mean? The term reasonable doubt is a substantial doubt, a real and substantial doubt that you will have in your mind as reasonable individuals after consideration of all of theevidence or based on the fact that there was a lackof evidence. That is the type of doubt that would entitle the defendant to an acquittal. The substantial doubt or reasonable doubt that we refer to is not a speculative type doubt or guessing doubt. That type of doubt would not require an acquittal of the defendant, or a conjectural type of doubt, but the doubt that would entitle the defendant to an acquittal would be a real and substantial doubt that you would arrive at from the evidence or based on the fact that there was a lack of evidence. Some judges charge juries that the doubt that is required for the reasonable doubt element could be ascertained this way, if after considering all the evidence presented, you have an abiding conviction of the guilt of the defendant, you would, in effect, be believing the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As I said, the responsibility of proof is on the State. The proof, of course, refers to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. You might wonder what that really means. It means the same thing as beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant guilty as to a moral certainty, it would be likewise finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. They are legal equivalents, they are legally the same thing. Where you fail to find the State has proven the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, you must acquit the defendant. …" (Emphasis added).

¶10In King, supra, this court recognized there were inconsistencies in previous decisions and opinions of this court concerning refusal of charges on reasonable doubt arising from "part of the evidence." See also Sanford v. State,37 Ala. App. 603, 75 So.2d 109 (1954). In King this court followedRakestraw v. State, 211 Ala. 535, 101 So. 181 (1924), and expressly overruled that portion of Cagle v. State, 211 Ala. 346,100 So. 318 (1924), covering the refusal of the charge on reasonable doubt arising from "part of the evidence." This court again in Dillard, supra, granted certiorari in light ofKing and discussed the standard to be applied to jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt.

¶11The principle of law as stated in King, and restated inDillard, is "the refusal of it [requested jury instruction] by the trial court will not constitute prejudicial error if the principle of law expressed therein was substantially and fairly covered *925 elsewhere in the trial court's charge to the jury." (Emphasis added.) Dillard, supra at 371 So.2d 948.

¶12The effect of King is that, if by the oral charge or by other requested jury instructions, the jury is presented a discussion of the reasonable doubt standard as applied to the evidence in its totality, then the failure to give instructions similar to defendant's charges one and five is not error to reverse. Code 1975, § 12-16-13.

¶13The trial court in its oral instructions to the jury discussed the reasonable doubt standard as applied to the evidence in its totality and substantially and fairly covered that standard. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to that court for decision not inconsistent with this opinion.

¶14REVERSED AND REMANDED.

¶15TORBERT, C.J., and BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

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