Brown III v. Uphoff’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate · 2 district · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Whether the rule of Crawford should be retroactively applied, therefore, depends on whether it meets one of the two exceptions articulated by the Court in Teague . Clearly, the first exception does not apply because Crawford does not place private conduct beyond the power of law-making authority to proscribe. We must examine then whether Crawford set forth a `watershed rule' of criminal procedure. As we have noted before, this exception is narrowly defined. Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2002). `To qualify as a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure, the rule must not only improve the accuracy with which defendants are convicted or acquitted, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.' Mora, 293 F.3d at 1218-19 (quotation omitted). We conclude that the rule in Crawford does not meet this definition. "It is true that in Crawford the Court referred to the protections of the Confrontation Clause as a `bedrock procedural guarantee,' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 , 124 S. Ct. at 1359 , but that comment does not necessarily suggest that the rule set forth in Crawford is `on the magnitude of the rule announced in Gideon v. Wainwright ' as it must be to fit within the Teague exception. See Mora, 293 F.3d at 1219. Unlike Gideon, Crawford does not `alter [ ] our understanding of what constitutes basic due process,' Mora, 293 F.3d at 1219, but merely sets out new standards for the admission of certain ”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Bockting v. Bayer · Marvin Howard Bockting v. Robert Bayer

2. “As we explained above, prior to the decision in Crawford, Roberts provided the appropriate framework for determining whether the admission of hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court itself noted that the logic of Roberts was inconsistent with the Court’s conclusion in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause requires an opportunity to cross-examine before testimonial hearsay may be admitted against the defendant. Crawford , — U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 1369. Thus, Roberts and its progeny did not dictate the result in Crawford and we conclude that it announces a new rule of constitutional law. See Crawford, at -, 124 S.Ct. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s holding as a “new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause”).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bockting v. Bayer · Marvin Howard Bockting v. Robert Bayer

3. “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her. This constitutional provision does not preclude the admission of all out-of-court statements. In determining the admissibility of hearsay exceptions, the court must also consider the requirements of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The Confrontation Clause can operate to bar the admission of evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule if confrontation requirements are not met.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Drach v. Bruce