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← 381 F.3d 221 - Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft

Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft’s Empirical Analysis

381 F.3d 221 · 2004

Citation profile

167
cited by 167 later decisions
1
states following
October 2021
most recently cited

41 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 167 later decisions — most recently October 2021 · most notably Shi Liang Lin v. United States Department of Justice (2007), Li v. Attorney General of the United States (2005)

41 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

970200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca · Dandridge v. Williams · United States v. Mead Corp. · Lamie v. United States Trustee

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 167 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Chevron applies when ‘it appears that Congress delegated authority to ... [an administrative] agency ... to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’ United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 , 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164 , 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). If Chevron applies, a court must ask (at what is customarily called step one) ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.’ Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 . ‘If so, courts, as well as the agency, “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” ’ Household Credit Servs. Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 , [239], 158 L.Ed.2d 450 (2004) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 ). ‘However, whenever Congress has “explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” ’ a court must proceed to step two, and ‘the agency’s [interpretation] is “given controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” ’ Id. (second brackets in original) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 ). The Court has described this test as one of reasonableness. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845, 865, 866 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 .””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.