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← 381 So. 2d 690 - Brown v. State

381 So. 2d 690 - Brown v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1980

Citation profile

50
cited by 50 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
January 2014
most recently cited

40 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 50 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2014 · most notably Wainwright v. Witt (1985), Barclay v. Florida (1983)

40 state decisions

3801980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Giglio v. United States · Witherspoon v. Illinois · 110 So. 2d 654 - Williams v. State · Pope v. Nebraska · 283 So. 2d 1 - State v. Dixon

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true. Especially is this true where the recantation involves a confession of perjury.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"Although improper aggravating circumstances (factors enumerated 1 and 2) went into the calculus of the trial judge's sentence decision and there was identified a mitigating circumstance (appellant's age), nevertheless, Elledge v. State , 346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977) does not *Page 127 compel a reversal of the sentence judgment in this case. This is so because unlike Elledge , here `we can know' that the result of the weighing process would not have been different had the impermissible factors not been present. 346 So.2d at 1003 . "The trial judge has told us in his order that the appellant's age, 22 years at the time of the offense and 23 years at the time of the trial, had only `some minor significance.' When this tenuous factor is juxtaposed against at least two well-founded aggravating circumstances it is beyond reason to conclude that the trial judge's decision to impose the death penalty would have been affected by the elimination of the unauthorized aggravating circumstances. This case then is dissimilar to Elledge , but like Hargrave v. State , 366 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1978), where the doubling up of aggravating circumstances was not fatal to the imposition of a death sentence even in light of the existence of two mitigating circumstances. Here, as there, ample other statutory aggravating circumstances exist to convince us that the weighing process has not been compromised."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"[g]iven the imprecision of the criteria set forth in our capital punishment statute we must test for reasoned judgment in the sentencing process rather than a mechanical tabulation to arrive at a net sum. Hargrave v. State , supra; State v. Dixon , 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973)."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.