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382 F.2d 566

Docket No. 20477.

Tolefree v. Ritz

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Aug. 3, 1967.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1967-08-03

2 counsel of record

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Monroe v. Pape · Egan v. City of Aurora · Molnar v. National Broadcasting Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1967-08-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently March 1998

5 federal appellate · 2 district ·

701967197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Jesse W. Tolefree, in pro. per.

¶2James P. O’Drain, City Atty., John R. Pierce, Deputy City Atty., Richmond, Cal., for appellees.

¶3Before HAMLEY, MERRILL and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM:

¶5Jesse W. Tolefree, proceeding pro. per., commenced this action under the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(1), (3) and (4) (1964), and Rev.Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), to recover damages from Harry Ritz, the City of Richmond, and seven “Does.”

¶6Defendants moved to dimiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The district court granted the motion with leave to amend. Plaintiff *567filed an amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court granted this motion and dismissed the action. Tolefree appeals.

¶7The action was properly dismissed as to the City of Richmond Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514, 81 S.Ct. 684, 5 L.Ed.2d 741; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492. It was also properly dismissed as to the fictitious defendants. Molnar v. National Broadcasting Company, 9 Cir., 231 F.2d 684, 687. See, also, California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 9 Cir., 291 F.2d 252, 253. If plaintiff later ascertains the names of additional persons he wishes to join as defendants, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a way of doing so.

¶8In his amended complaint Tole-free alleges sufficient facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction as to his Civil Rights Act claim against Ritz, and sufficient facts to state a claim against Ritz under that Act upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the action should not have been dismissed for either of these reasons.

¶9Counsel for all of the appellees advises us in his answering brief that Ritz is now deceased. This presents a question not dealt with in the district court nor by the parties on this appeal, namely, does the civil rights action for damages survive the death of the only defendant left in the case? This is a matter to be taken up in the district court upon the remand of this cause. See Pritchard v. Smith, 8 Cir., 289 F.2d 153, 88 A.L.R. 2d 1146; Lauderdale v. Smith, D.C.Ark., 186 F.Supp. 958.

¶10If the action does survive and if, in order to answer the amended complaint, Ritz’ personal representative needs additional information concerning the nature of the Civil Rights Act claim asserted against him, he may move for a more definite statement. See Rule 12(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

¶11Affirmed as to defendant City of Richmon(j an(j the fictitious defendants; reversed as to defendant Ritz, and remanded for further proceedings,

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