Evans v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

60 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[A]s a general rule, a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence is not appropriate where the alleged illegality ‘did not inhere in [the defendant’s] sentence.’ State v. Kanaras, supra, 357 Md. [170,] at 185, 742 A.2d [508,] at 517 [1999]. A motion to correct an illegal sentence ordinarily can be granted only where there is some illegality in the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been imposed. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 171 , 797 A.2d 1287, 1290 (2002); Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190 , 763 A.2d 737 (2000); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651, 662-663 , 736 A.2d 285, 291 (1999). On the other hand, a trial court error during the sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) where the resulting sen tence or sanction is itself lawful. Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323 , 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989)....””

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Matthews v. State · Tshiwala v. State

2. “"Rule 4-345. Sentencing — Revisory power of court. (a) Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. State · State v. Wilkins

3. “The defendant Oken argued, relying on recent Supreme Court cases, that a constitutional error in the capital sentencing proceeding contributed to the death sentence. Section 2 — 303(i) of the Maryland death penalty statute provides that the trier of facts “shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the aggravating circumstances under subsection (g) of this section outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” (Emphasis added). In Oken , the case was presented to the sentencing jury under this “preponderance of the evidence” standard. The defendant Oken had raised no objection to this in the sentencing proceeding or in a prior post conviction proceeding. In the Rule 4-345 proceeding, however, Oken argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard violated due process and that a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard was constitutionally required. This Court, in the Rule 4-345 proceeding, re solved the merits of the constitutional issue, with the majority holding that application of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard was constitutional. See also Oken v. State, 367 Md. 191, 195 , 786 A.2d 691, 693 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1074 , 122 S.Ct. 1953 , 152 L.Ed.2d 855 (2002), where the Court decided the merits of a similar challenge by the defendant Oken.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Baker v. State