Harrison v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

71 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The standard of review for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79 [ 649 A.2d 336 ] (1994). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 [ 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ] (1979) and Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 182-83 [ 502 A.2d 496 ] (1986)). We give ‘due regard to the [fact finder’s] finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.’ McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474 [ 701 A.2d 675 ] (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151 [ 118 S.Ct. 1173 , 140 L.Ed.2d 182 ] (1998) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478 [ 649 A.2d 336 ]).””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wisneski v. State · 201 Md. App. 276 - Perez v. State

2. ““The most compelling reason why we reject the doctrine of transferred intent as applied to crimes of attempt is that it is not necessary to make ‘a whole crime out of two halves by joining the intent as to one victim with the harm caused to another victim,’ the purpose for which it was conceived. Ford, 330 Md. at 712 , 625 A.2d at 998 . When the unintended victim has not suffered a fatal injury, the defendant already has committed a completed crime against the intended victim, and the seriousness of that crime is as great as if the intent were transferred to the unintended victim. “Further, although not in this case, a defendant may be convicted of a crime against an unintended victim with the use of ‘concurrent intent’ and without the use of ‘transferred intent.’ Such a defendant also may be convicted of criminal battery, and as Judge Moylan suggested in Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401, 430 , 681 A.2d 628, 643 (1996), ‘the crime of reckless endangerment is also available to pick up much of the slack and to make resort to the transferred intent doctrine less compelling.’ There is little, if any, utility in extending the doctrine of ‘transferred intent’ to inchoate crimes such as attempted murder.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Brady · Pettigrew v. State

3. ““Petitioner tries to unduly stretch our holding in Ford that the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to attempted murder. We reject Poe’s argument that because he completed the crime of attempted murder of his intended victim, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the death of another person. In Ford , we made clear that if a defendant intends to kill a specific victim and instead wounds an unintended victim without killing either, the defendant can be convicted only of the attempted murder of the intended victim and transferred intent does not apply. ... This is not true where, as in the case sub jud;ice, the defendant intends to murder one victim and instead kills an unintended victim. Here, transferred intent applies because there is a death and the doctrine is necessary to impose criminal liability for the murder of the unintended victim in addition to the attempted murder of the intended victim.... In Ford , this Court asserted that the doctrine is used when the defendant fails to commit the crime intended upon the targeted victim and completes it upon another.... Thus, the doctrine should be applied to the instant case.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Brady · Pettigrew v. State