382 Pa. Super. 127 - Commonwealth v. Greer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

45 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right has been violated, it must first be determined whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. [Citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Jones v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 490 , 434 A.2d 1197 (1981) ]. If the delay is sufficient to trigger further inquiry, the reviewing court must balance the length of the delay with the reason for the delay, the defendant’s timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and any resulting prejudice to the interests protected by the right to a speedy trial. [Citing Barker, supra; Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621 , 417 A.2d 597 (1980) ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 391 Pa. Super. 363 - Commonwealth v. Andrews · Commonwealth v. Anders

2. “Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that constitution al legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully revealed on appeal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 156 Pa. Commw. 366 - Commonwealth v. Lal

3. “However, it is abundantly clear from the record that the trial court, in effect, did not impose a harsher sentence. At the time of the original sentencing, it was the intention of the sentencing judges to have the sentences at 1009 C.A.1979 and 1060 C.A.1979 run consecutively. Instantly, Judge Erb’s decision to have the present sentences run consecutively to those imposed by Judge Cassimatis merely gives effect to the original sentencing scheme. Simply put, the appellant will first serve the sentences imposed by Judge Cassimatis at 1060 C.A.1979 and then will serve the sentences imposed by Judge Erb, rather than vice versa as originally intended. (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 390 Pa. Super. 76 - Commonwealth v. Walker