Hubbard v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “reasonable to conclude that when the defendant handed the keys to the police officer he voluntarily relinquished all expectation of privacy.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 518 So. 2d 186 - Morgan v. State · 790 So. 2d 975 - Acklin v. State

2. “"[I]t is impossible to determine what actually motivated enactment of the twenty year period. Hence we are forced to identify the purpose that the statute in fact serves, and presume a legislative intent to serve that purpose. "The statute was obviously enacted with a view to the protection of society from a certain class of criminal with the belief that a hardened criminal needed more severe punishment than a first offender.... ". . . . "We do not think it unreasonable to suggest that the legislature, faced with enacting the death penalty laws for this state, reasoned that it is not every prior conviction for murder which upon a subsequent conviction should be subject to the death penalty but only those which occur within a limited period of time. Indeed it could be argued that the very act of instituting the twenty year period was an affirmative and reasoned approach rather than merely including any prior conviction. Considering society's right to be protected from the depravity of the criminally inclined and the duty of the government to secure to its citizens the enjoyment of their lives and property against the unlawful aggression of the criminal class, we conclude that the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Merely because the legislature could have created a different classification does not make the present one arbitrary."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Spurlock · 500 So. 2d 1204 - Hubbard v. State

3. “"The statute was obviously enacted with a view to the protection of society from a certain class of criminal with the belief that a hardened criminal needed more severe punishment than a first offender. Such statutes which enhance sentence are not violative of the due process clause, Graham v. West Virginia , 224 U.S. 616 [ 32 S.Ct. 583 , 56 L.Ed. 917 ] . . . (1912); Moore v. Missouri , 159 U.S. 673 [ 16 S.Ct. 179 , 40 L.Ed. 301 ] . . . (1895), and do not create an unreasonable classification. McDonald v. Massachusetts , 180 U.S. 311 [ 21 S.Ct. 389 , 45 L.Ed. 542 ] . . . [1901]. Generally see 58 A.L.R. 20 (1929); 82 A.L.R. 345 (1933); 116 A.L.R. 209 (1938); 132 A.L.R. 91 (1941); 139 A.L.R. 673 (1942).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 500 So. 2d 1204 - Hubbard v. State · 599 So. 2d 1253 - Carroll v. State