Carson v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis
1964
Citation profile
44 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 46 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2012 · most notably James v. Kentucky (1984), State v. Coleman (1965)
44 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Escobedo v. Illinois · Massiah v. United States · Culombe v. Connecticut · Hamilton v. Alabama · Spano v. People of the State of New York
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In White the accused entered a guilty plea at his preliminary hearing. The trial court permitted evidence of that guilty plea upon the jury trial. In Hamilton it appeared that only at the examining trial could certain defenses be raised. It is true that in each of the cited opinions the Supreme Court wrote that prejudice is not the determinative question. However, in each of those cases definite prejudice to the accused was shown. The basis for both decisions appears to us to be that the particular preliminary hearings were considered to be ‘critical stages’ in the criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court rule, by which all federal and state courts are bound, is that due process requires that an accused have counsel at any critical stage of the criminal proceeding, unless that right is competently waived. If it is found that opportunity for counsel has not been afforded at a critical stage, the matter of prejudice is not involved. The deter minative factor is whether the particular activity is at a critical stage.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage““We envision a situation wherein an examining magistrate arbitrarily refuses to permit the defendant to have counsel; then the magistrate discharges the accused from custody upon a finding that no probable cause to hold him had been shown. Thereafter a grand jury returns an indictment accusing the defendant of the crime. Would the failure of the magistrate to furnish counsel at the examining trial preclude prosecution of the defendant? We cannot perceive that it would. By parity of reasoning, it is our conclusion that the alleged failure to furnish counsel to the present appellant at the preliminary hearing is not available as error here. It is our view that the examining trial (in Kentucky) is not such a critical stage of the proceeding as brings it within the purview of Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, or White v. Maryland, supra. Unless it is shown that something prejudicial to the defendant occurred by reason of his lack of counsel at that stage, there has been no infringement of his fundamental rights.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage““This jurisdiction has long held fast the fundamental right of an accused to be represented' by counsel. Kentucky Constitution § 11 specifically provides that an accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel in all criminal prosecutions. This court has repeatedly held that the accused’s right to counsel is an inviolable one, and may be waived only if done understandingly, intelligently, competently and voluntarily. Schneider v. Com., Ky., 332 S.W.2d 250 ; Roberts v. Com., Ky., 339 S.W.2d 640 ; Hart v. Com., Ky., 296 S.W.2d 212 ; 6 Ky.Digest 2, Criminal Law, 641””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.