Deville v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

137 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 137 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “If the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear, we look to legislative history, prior case law, and statutory purpose.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 242 Md. App. 73 - Kimble v. State · Watts v. State

2. ““In some cases, the statutory text reveals ambiguity, and then the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. However, before judges may look to other sources for interpretation, first there must exist an ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. Where the statutory language is free from such ambiguity, courts will neither look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent nor add to or delete words from the statute. Only when faced with ambiguity will courts consider both the literal or usual meaning of the words as well as their meaning in light of the objectives and purposes of the enactment. As our predecessors noted, ‘We cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out. Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists.’ Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the statutory text.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Chow v. State · Watts v. State

3. “Looking to [the legislative] history, it is apparent that the General Assembly wanted to punish violators of Maryland drug laws, and that, those who had previously served a specific term of confinement of at least 180 days, were to be given a more harsh sentence for a subsequent violation, be it either manufacturing, distribution, or conspiring to distribute controlled dangerous substances. Indeed, looking to the present Section 5-608(c) as a whole and in context, this reading of the intent of the statute is sound, notwithstanding the absence of the word “conspiracy” in Section 5-608(c)(l)(i).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 169 Md. App. 98 - Harris v. State