Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] judicial officer in Maryland, under current Maryland law may not issue a ‘no-knock’ warrant. Rather, the propriety of a ‘no-knock’ entry will be reviewed and determined on the basis of the facts known to the officers at the time of entry, rather than at the time of the application for the warrant.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 161 Md. App. 226 - Archie v. State · Parker v. State

2. “The rationale underlying this holding was set out as follows: “The decision as to how entry is to be made balances, at the least, the privacy interest of the individual, the need to protect the safety of police officers and the need to preserve evidence. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 387 , 117 S.Ct. at 1418 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 620 . The probable cause analysis, on the other hand, while ultimately concerned with the privacy issue, is more fact based, it is concerned more specifically with the probability of the item or items that are the subject of the inquiry being in the place to be searched. Thus, what the Supreme Court pointed out in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948), where the issue was probable cause, is entirely logical, absent exigent circumstances, deference to the determination of a detached warrant-issuing judge rather than a ‘zealous’ officer engaged in the often-adrenaline charged task of “ferreting out crime,” is appropriate, because it supports the goal of encouraging officers to seek warrants. When the issue concerns the farm of entry, however, probable cause for the search already having been established, the appropriate inquiry, and thus the decision to be reviewed, is whether the form used was reasonable in light of the facts as known to the officer at the time of the entry. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1633 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 742 (1963) (‘In addition to the officers’ belief that Ker was i”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Carroll

3. ““ ‘Somewhat more vexing is the consideration whether the warrant itself provides say a sufficient basis for a no-knock forced entry. The cases, which have been discussed by the defense, and reviewed by the Court, largely involve situations in which law enforcement officers were confronted with situations which post entry were determined either to rise to the level of exigency permitting no-knock entry or failed to meet that standard, and thus require suppression. “ ‘No cases were found in which the issue presented was, in this context, in which there was pre-raid approval for a no-knock entry on a set of facts which essentially recite the officers’ general and specific experience in law enforcement, from which they extrapolate the need, as they perceive it, for a no-knock entry. It is, of course, well-settled in search and seizure law that the issuing judge is permitted to rely upon the experience of law enforcement officers and the conclusions which reasonably flow from that experience in making the probable cause determination. “ T see no reason to depart from that pattern when the examination is not the presence or absence of probable cause, but is instead the existence of exigencies meriting a no-knock entry. It is, in any event, a close question for the Court. “ ‘However, crediting the affiants’ experience which involves hundreds of narcotics arrests, extensive training, and considerable experience in narcotics law enforcement, 1 cannot conclude that their conclusion wit”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Carroll