KRL v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 federal appellate · 5 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Riebe approved the second search warrant on January 4, 1999, when it was limited to 1995. At that time, although the warrant still lacked probable cause, it had a more reasonable temporal limit; it alleged fraudulent activity and tax evasion dating to 1997; it alleged hazardous waste violations in 1995 and 1996 at the Bosse Road Property, as well as with the storage tank; and it alleged that Womack withdrew funds from KRL for personal expenses and illegal activities. We conclude that the warrant, as it stood on January 4, was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” Riebe’s approval of the second search warrant was reasonable, and, to the extent it was investigative rather than prosecutorial, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court properly denied qualified immunity to Hall on Plaintiffs’ claim that he unreasonably relied on the search warrant and that he seized documents predating 1990 during the January 13 search. Assuming he was the lead investigator, Hall would have greater responsibility for ensuring that the warrant was not defective. Even if probable cause existed to believe KRL was “permeated with fraud” since 1995, no reasonable officer could conclude that the discovery of a 1990 ledger and several checks showed that KRL had been primarily engaged in fraudulent activity since 1990. The fact that a judge and a prosecutor had approved the warrant does not make Hall’s reliance on it reason”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. KRL v. Estate of Moore

2. “A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil action for damages when he or she performs a function that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 430, 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). A prosecutor’s functions that are protected by absolute immunity include initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case, id. at 431 [ 96 S.Ct. 984 ], appearing at a probable cause hearing to support an application for a search warrant, [Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 , 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934 , 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)], and preparing and filing an arrest warrant. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 , 129, 118 S.Ct. 502 , 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997). However, the functions of an advocate do not include advising police officers whether probable cause exists during their pretrial investigation, Burns, 500 U.S. at 493 , 111 S.Ct. 1934 , fabricating evidence before probable cause has been established, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 , 275, 113 S.Ct. 2606 , 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), or attesting to the facts that support an arrest warrant. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130-31 [ 118 S.Ct. 502 ],”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ewing v. City of Stockton

3. “to the extent that the second search warrant sought evidence to prosecute the crimes charged in the indictment,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Genzler v. Longanbach