Fischetti v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 federal appellate · 5 district · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]f our rule on habeas review were to determine if the state judge properly extrapolated the general principles that can be derived from Faretta, Patterson [v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988)], and Martinez to this different factual setting, we might disagree with the state court ruling. That is not our role. In reviewing the reasonableness of the state courts’ application of Supreme Court precedent, we must use as our point of departure the specific holdings of the Court’s decisions. When assessing whether the state court acted reasonably in applying or refusing to apply that precedent, we must be mindful that the issue is whether Supreme Court law “dictated” a result in our case, Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (plurality); see Moore, 255 F.3d at 104-05, or whether the circumstances presented here were “closely analogous” to those that formed the basis of earlier high court decisions, Penry, 492 U.S. at 314, 109 S.Ct. '2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (internal quotations and citations omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Wilkerson v. Klem · Thomas v. Carroll

2. “None of these cases approves the specific decision made by the trial judge here. But the appellate cases do establish that the Supreme Court’s general right to counsel decisions are reasonably read as qualified by the trial court’s power to remedy abuse of that right through forfeiture. Further, none of these cited appellate cases saw in the Supreme Court’s precedents any clear guidance as to the precise standard to be applied before forfeiture can be triggered. Put another way, the Supreme Court has not fully defined when a defendant’s misconduct or defiance warrants a forfeiture. Our canvass of decisions of our own and sister courts reinforces our view that the state court order that Fischetti proceed without counsel was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court case law under the Sixth Amendment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Wilkerson v. Klem

3. “[T]he Court’s established precedent in this area has not expressly dealt with the matter of forfeiture of counsel, which is the exact issue here. As we have discussed, forfeiture and voluntary waiver are conceptually separate. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions have not involved facts that are “materially indistinguishable” from the facts surrounding Fischetti’s actions in this case. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 ; Moore, 255 F.3d at 107. It follows that the state court ruling here was not contrary to federal law as articulated by decisions of the Supreme Court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Wilkerson v. Klem