dissent">Justice PLEICONES.

I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, our cases holding that evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct is admissible in a trial for criminal sexual conduct with a minor as a “common scheme or plan” under Rule 404(b), SCRE, have, in effect, created an exception to the rule’s exclusion of propensity evidence. Compare, e.g., Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 554 *436A.2d 1231 (Ct.App.1989). We have repeatedly held in nonsexual offense cases that, “the mere presence of similarity only serves to enhance the potential for prejudice,” State v. Tuffour, 364 S.C. 497, 613 S.E.2d 814 (Ct.App.2005) vacated on other grounds 371 S.C. 511, 641 S.E.2d 24 (2007) internal citations omitted, yet under the majority’s view, similarity is the touchstone of admissibility in child sexual offense cases. In my view, if we are to permit the admission of propensity evidence in these types of cases, then we should propose a new rule of evidence, and encourage public comment. See e.g. Rules 413 and 414, Fed.R.Evid.; Rule 404(c), Az. R. Evid. In light of the controversy engendered by these rules in other jurisdictions,7 I believe that thorough scrutiny is warranted.

. I note that The Advisory Committees on Criminal and Civil Rtdes, except for the Department of Justice representative, the Study Committee, except for the DOJ representative, and the Judicial Conference unanimously urged Congress to reconsider these Rules.

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