384 So. 2d 1171 - Hines v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1980
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 32 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently January 2003 · most notably 516 So. 2d 726 - Jackson v. State (1985), Dunkins v. Thigpen (1988)
2 federal appellate · 32 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Johnson v. Zerbst · Escobedo v. Illinois · Lego v. Twomey · Culombe v. Connecticut
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"`[I]n most cases, the defendant's mental deficiency will be but one factor to be considered in the `totality of the circumstances' surrounding the confession. In some cases, however, it may be the most important or controlling factor. See e.g. Dover v. State, 227 So.2d 296 (Miss. 1969); People v. Langston, 57 Mich.App. 666 , 226 N.W.2d 686 (1975). See also Redwine v. State, 258 Ala. 196 , 61 So.2d 724 (1952). The importance of this factor increases with the degree of the accused's mental retardation because he must be able to understand his right to remain silent and to an attorney before he can waive them. It is a knowing and intelligent waiver that is required. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)'; Garrett v. State, 369 So.2d 833, 836 (Ala. 1979)." (Footnote omitted.)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“"Under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Alabama, any suspect of a crime is guaranteed the right of assistance of counsel and the right to remain silent during in-custody police interrogation. So sacred are these rights that any statement obtained in violation of them is inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The suspect may, of course, waive these rights provided that the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made. Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). However, the United States Supreme Court has stated: "`[A] heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. State of Illinois , 378 U.S. 478 , 490 , n. 14, 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 1764 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 . This court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and we reassert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation.' Miranda , 384 U.S. at 475 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“When expert testimony indicates that a defendant could have intelligently understood the waiver of his constitutional rights only if they were simply and clearly explained, the record must expressly and specifically establish that such an explanation was given.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.