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384 S.W.2d 507

Hawkins v. Wallace

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Decided December 4, 1964

Court of Appeals of Kentucky · decided 1964-12-04

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently December 1965

1 state decisions

Applies KY 413 § 413.120

Relies on Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling · City of Ashland v. Kittle · Kentucky West Virginia Gas Company v. Matny

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1964-12-04

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MONTGOMERY, Judge.

¶1Gus O. Wallace et al. recovered judgment against Henderson Hawkins et al. in the sum of $3,000 as damages suffered from *508the operation and maintenance of a nuisance. A permanent injunction also was granted. On appeal it is urged that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and the instructions were prejudicially erroneous.

¶2Appellees sued on August 31, 1959. They complained of the dust from the operation of a coal-loading ramp and coal crusher by the appellants.

¶3The construction of the ramp and crusher was commenced in 1949. This structure from its size and nature is a permanent one. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Laswell, 299 Ky. 799, 187 S.W.2d 732; City of Ashland v. Kittle, Ky., 305 S.W.2d 768. There is no allegation or proof of negligent operation. No question of improper construction is presented. The dust constitutes a permanent nuisance. Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 264 Ky. 470, 95 S.W.2d 1.

¶4The rule is stated in Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Matny, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 805, thus:

“ … where damages are caused by a permanent structure properly constructed, and not negligently operated, a recovery must be had for the permanent nuisance once and for all, and the action must be brought within five years from the date such structure was completed and its operation commenced or from the date of the first injury, or from the date it became apparent there would be injuries resulting from the structure or its operation.”

¶5The construction of the structure was completed in 1950. Appellants leased the premises and started operations in 1952. Appellees claimed that they first suffered from the dust in 1953. They could not open 'their restaurant in late 1953 or early 1954 because of the dust. Under the Matny rule, appellees’ cause of action was barred when they sued on August 31, 1959, by the five-year statute, KRS 413.120, under either of the alternatives presented.

¶6No brief has been filed by appellees. The Court has consequently chosen to reverse the judgment since appellants’ brief reasonably appears to sustain such action. RCA 1.260(c) (2). This view makes it unnecessary to discuss the question of the instructions.

¶7Judgment reversed with direction to enter judgment for the appellants.

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