Smith v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

117 federal appellate · 2 district · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 137 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Possession” within the meaning of the statute may be either actual or constructive, constructive possession being dominion and control over the illegal drug. Such possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared with others, and is susceptible of proof by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. >: *”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cazares-Ramirez v. United States · United States v. Richardson

2. ““The appellants allege that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motions for severance, both as to the joinder of offenses and as to the join-der of defendants. In regard to any allegation of misjoinder of offenses, the relevant rule is Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule should not be in-interpreted in a technical or legalistic sense . . . [citations omitted] Where, as here, the offenses arose out of a series of connected acts, trial convenience dictates ‘that the govern ment should not be made to prove the same facts more than once.’ [citations omitted] “Similarly, there was no misjoinder of defendants. Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure In conjunction with Rule 8 (a) joinder of offenses, Rule 8(b) has the effect of permitting joinder of defendants where their alleged violations of law have arisen out of the same act or series of acts [citations omitted] “Having found that there was no misjoinder of offenses or defendants under Rule 8, it is still necessary to determine whether there was sufficient prejudice to require a severance under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . [citations omitted] The existence of prejudice, in large measure, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case . . . [citations omitted] and it is axiomatic that the granting of a severance is within the discretion of the trial judge . [citations omitted] The burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Lane

3. ““Lott argues that the joint trial denied him the opportunity to call Smith as a witness for the purpose of explaining his possession [of heroin]. An intention of the movant to have his codefendant testify has never been considered ground for severance. [Citing, inter alia, Kolod v. United States, 10 Cir., 1967, 371 F.2d 983 ; Gorin v. United States, 1 Cir., 1963, 313 F.2d 641 ; Olmstead v. United States, 9 Cir., 1967, 19 F.2d 842 , 53 A.L.R. 1472 .] This is especially true where, as here, any prejudice resulting from the joint trial is merely speculative. Lott has neither shown nor asserted that (1) Smith’s version of the facts would have any exculpatory effect [Citing United States v. Echeles, 7 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 892 . See also Garnett v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 404 F.2d 26 (per curiam).] or that (2) Smith would more likely testify were he tried separately. [Citing, inter alia, Kolod v. United States, supra.] We do not conjecture abuses of discretion.” (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tillman v. United States