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← 385 FSUPP 1009 - Halpern v. Austin

Halpern v. Austin’s Empirical Analysis

1974

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
3
states following
January 2015
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently January 2015

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions

7019741980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 28 U.S.C. § 2201 · 28 U.S.C. § 2281 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. · Armstrong v. Manzo · Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View · Barber v. Page · Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he present statutes in issue satisfy due process because the debtor is on construe tive notice, having received a hearing in the primary adjudication of the underlying claim. The conditional nature of a judgment for alimony does not change this, as the final judgment placed the burden of taking the initiative in avoiding the judgment’s effects upon the husband. Requiring additional notice and hearing before garnishment will result in shifting this burden to the wife which the original decree places upon the husband. This court will not strike down a state statutory scheme which announces the state policy requiring the husband to affirmatively show that a duty created by a valid decree has ended. Accordingly, absent special circumstances, Sniadach and its progeny should be limited to pre-judgment summary seizures and not be expanded into the post-judgment realm.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"[T]he established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require that a defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in court, should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have a further notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to reach his property in satisfaction of the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential that he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must take 'notice of what will follow,’ no further notice being 'necessary to advance justice.’ ””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"I think that due process is afforded only by the the kinds of 'notice’ and 'hearing’ which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use. I think this is the thrust of the past cases of this Court.” 395 U.S. at 343.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.