385 F. Supp. 621 - Casey v. Purser’s Empirical Analysis
1974
Citation profile
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Relies on United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs · Monroe v. Pape · Jenkins v. McKeithen · Moor v. County of Alameda · City of Kenosha v. Bruno
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“***** * * * * [TJhere is a significant difference between Gibbs and [the present type of] cases. For the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the claims against the County would require us to bring an entirely new party — a new defendant — into each litigation. Gibbs, of course, involved no such problem of a “pendent party”, that is, of the addition of a party which is implicated in the litigation only with respect to the pendent state law claim and not also with respect to any claim as to which there is an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. Faced with this distinction, the courts below concluded that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in the context of these cases was inappropriate as a matter of both judicial power and discretion. * * * ******”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.