385 So. 2d 993 - Collins v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`It does not matter that during the opening statement the accused has or has not taken the stand, his constitutional right to remain silent may still be violated. The argument that no harm can be ascertained from remarks indifferent to that right until closing arguments, after the accused has elected not to testify is ill conceived and ill thought out. Certainly, we would be remiss in our duty if we failed to recognize the danger of the district attorney, early in the proceedings, directly or indirectly focusing the jury's attention on what the accused will or will not testify to, or on what he previously has or has not admitted. In many instances, if this tactic were allowed, the prejudice to the accused would be even greater than if the comment were made after all the testimony had been taken. If permitted, the jury would be on their constant guard, anticipating the accused's "chance to tell his story." This form of prejudice to an accused's right to receive a fair trial will not be sanctioned or tolerated by this court. An accused's right to remain silent is inviolable at every stage in the proceedings and must be afforded due protection.' " Collins v. State , 385 So.2d 993 , 1001 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), reversed on other grounds, 385 So.2d 1005 (Ala. 1980)."”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 723 So. 2d 810 - Baxter v. State · 607 So. 2d 298 - Purser v. State

2. “entitled to great weight and will not be interfered with unless clearly erroneous, equivalent to an abuse of discretion.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kumar v. Lewis · 545 So. 2d 151 - Brownlee v. State

3. “"The first indictment specified serial number 301913640. It was uncertain whether the recovered heat pump, in fact, had that serial number. Even though it was unnecessary for the state to prove the serial number to establish a prima facie case of grand larceny or buying, receiving, or concealing, the law is settled that if an indictment contains an unnecessary averment, nonetheless it becomes necessary for the state to prove it, and there can be no conviction without such proof. Gilmore v. State , 99 Ala. 154 , 13 So. 536 [(1893)]; Weatherly v. State , 33 Ala. App. 127 , 30 So.2d 484 [(1947)]. Stated another way, where a particular kind of property is specifically described in an indictment, it must be proved as laid. Bell v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 364 So.2d 420 , cert. denied Ala., 364 So.2d 424 [(1978)]; Lee v. State , 20 Ala. App. 334 , 101 So. 907 , cert. denied, 212 Ala. 135 , 101 So. 909 [(1924)]. Under the foregoing authority it would have been incumbent upon the state to prove that the serial number on the recovered unit was that specified in the indictment. Since the appellant would not consent to an amendment to the indictment, the state was placed in the position of not being able to prove a prima facie case without the incorporation of Section 15-8-91 , Code 1975." Collins , 385 So.2d at 998.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 555 So. 2d 246 - Lunceford v. City of Northport · 551 So. 2d 1161 - Smith v. State