Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck’s Empirical Analysis
386 F.3d 183 · 2004
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 2000C · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
Relies on Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority · City of Boerne v. Flores · Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. · Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist · Jean v. Nelson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“prohibits a governmental entity from applying a land use regulation “in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person ... or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition' of the burden ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and ... [the burden imposed] is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We know of no controlling authority, either in the Supreme Court or any cireuit[,] holding that traffic problems are incapable of being deemed compelling. It is true that one circuit opinion in the Eighth Circuit recited that “interests in traffic safety and aesthetics ... have never been held to be compelling.” Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1408 (8th Cir.1995) (emphasis added). However, the fact that the case reports do not reveal any case in which a court has found traffic concerns compelling does not support the proposition that traffic concerns by nature cannot be compelling.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[i]n many cases, real property is used by religious institutions for purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions. While recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or operated by a religious institution, or may permit a religious institution to obtain additional funds to further its religious activities, this alone does not automatically bring these activities or facilities within [RLUIPA’s] definition or [sic] “religious exercise.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.