Gorge v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree may be sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole only if: (1) at least 30 days before trial, the State gave written notice to the defendant of the State’s intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole; and (2) the sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole is imposed in accordance with § 2-304 of this title.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 192 Md. App. 469 - Adams v. State · 184 Md. App. 295 - Hammersla v. State

2. “Only voluntary confessions are admissible as evidence under Maryland law. A confession is voluntary if it is “freely and voluntarily made” and the defendant making the confession “knew and understood what he [or she] was saying” at the time her or she said it. In order to be deemed voluntary, a confession must satisfy the mandates of the U.S. Constitution, the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights, the United States Supreme Court’s deci sion in Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ], and Maryland non-constitutional law.” The burden is on the State to prove that the confession was “freely and voluntarily made.” ... [A] defendant’s confession may not be used unless it is “shown to be free of any coercive barnacles that may have attached by improper means to prevent the expression from being voluntary.” We have said that we must look at the totality of the circumstances in order to decide the voluntariness of a statement.... [W]e “ ‘look to all elements of the interrogation, including the manner in which it was conducted, the number of officers present, and the age, education, and experience of the defendant.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 174 Md. App. 647 - Ayala v. State

3. ““In dealing with statutory commands, including time provisions such as these, courts often speak in terms of whether they are ‘mandatory’ or merely ‘directory’.... The suggestion implicit from such an analysis is that, if the command is ‘mandatory,’ some fairly drastic sanction must be imposed upon a finding of noncompliance, whereas if the command is ‘directory,’ noncompliance will result in some lesser penalty, or perhaps no penalty at all. That, indeed, is really the issue. When a legislative body commands that something be done, using words such as ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ rather than ‘may’ or ‘should,’ we must assume, absent some evidence to the contrary, that it was serious and that it meant for the thing to be done in the manner it directed. In that sense, the obligation to comply with the statute (or rule) is both mandatory and directory. The relevant question in such a case is whether the sanction sought for noncompliance is an appropriate one.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Woodfield v. WEST RIVER IMPROVEMENT ASSOC.