¶1This is an appeal from the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of a trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for the production of the transcript of certain testimony given before a “one-man grand jury”.
¶2The defendant, an attorney at law, testified before the said “one-man grand jury” on August 10, 1967. He was questioned about his representation of a certain Ann Decker who had appeared before the “grand jury” on July 18, 1967 with the defendant. Ann Decker also appeared before the “grand jury” on August 4, 1967 without the defendant.
¶3Under date of August 14, 1967 the “grand juror” ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the defendant so that he might be prosecuted for perjury and such warrant issued on that day.
¶4Thereafter the defendant made a motion for discovery asking under MCLA 767.6a; MSA 28.946(1) for the full transcript of his evidence given before the “grand jury” on August 10, 1967; the full transcript of the testimony of Ann Decker on any date, asserting that such transcripts were necessary for his preparation for preliminary examination.
¶5A hearing on the motion was had in the circuit court the judge held that the discovery requested, if necessary, should be granted only after the pre*712liminary examination established probable cause, and denied the motion.
¶6The Court of Appeals modified the circuit court’s order to direct the furnishing of a transcript of the defendant’s testimony and affirmed the court’s refusal to order the delivery of transcripts of Ann Decker’s testimony.
¶7For the Court of Appeals, Judge Levin has carefully analyzed and accurately stated the law and, in our view, correctly construed section 6a.
¶8His observation that “transcripts of Ann Decker’s testimony can only be obtained upon application to an order of the Supreme Court” is consonant with his construction of section 6a and is sound.
¶9We explained in People v Wimberly, 384 Mich 62 (1970) why we have come to favor pretrial discovery of material which may be essential to proper preparation of a defense. We were there dealing with a traditional grand jury. Here we are dealing with the so called “one-man grand jury”, and we deem it of equal importance.
¶10We are persuaded that a defendant charged with perjury before a “one-man grand jury” must have access to the transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses for or against him given before the “one-man grand juror” in order to be accorded due process.
¶11In Michigan the preliminary hearing is a judicial proceeding designed to establish probable cause that a crime has been committed and probable cause to believe the accused committed it. It is a critical stage of our criminal process.
¶12The pertinent parts of our Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter VI Examination of Offenders, MCLA 766.1 et seq.-, MSA 28.919 et seq. provide:
“Sec. 1. The state and accused shall be entitled to a prompt examination and determination by the *713examining magistrate in all criminal causes 4k IP ¶*
“Sec. 2. Whenever complaint shall he made to any magistrate … that a criminal offense not cognizable hy a justice of the peace has been committed, he shall examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses who may he produced hy him.
“Sec. 4. The magistrate before whom any person is brought on a charge of having committed an offense not cognizable hy a justice of the peace … shall examine the complainant and the witnesses in support of the prosecution … .
“Sec. 12. After the testimony in support of the prosecution has been given, the witnesses for the prisoner, if he have any, shall he sworn, examined and cross-examined and he may he assisted by counsel in such examination and in the cross-examination of the witnesses in support of the prosecution.
“Sec. 13. If it shall appear to the magistrate upon the examination of the whole matter, either that no offense has been committed or that there is not probable cause for charging the defendant therewith, he shall discharge such defendant.”
¶13These statutory provisions must be read in conjunction with the provisions in Const 1963, art 1, § 20 that “In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him; … to have the assistance of counsel for his defense * # * .”
¶14We read this last provision to accord a defendant the same assistance of counsel contemplated in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which was considered by the United States Supreme Court in Coleman v Alabama, 399 US 1; 90 S Ct 1999; 26 L Ed 2d 387 (1970) wherein the Court observed:
“Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to protect the indigent *714accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution. First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State’s case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail.”
¶15We are convinced that to be truly effective, counsel must be properly prepared for cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses and thus he must have access to the testimony of such witnesses before the grand jury touching on the matters in issue at the examination.
¶16We believe the rationale of People v Wimberly, supra,has equal applicability here. “These developments are entirely consonant with the growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal justice.” Dennis v United States, 384 US 855, 870; 86 S Ct 1840, 1849; 16 L Ed 2d 973, 984 (1966).
¶17Here where the legislature has provided that an accused shall be entitled to a transcript of his testimony before the grand jury and as the Court of Appeals observed “There is nothing in the statute which permits a construction limiting the right there conferred so that it may not be exercised *715before the preliminary examination … 20 Mich App 7 (1969). We perceive no reason why the accused should not have the transcript of the testimony of any witness touching on the matter in issue at the preliminary examination.
¶18The people argue that because a “one-man grand juror” is not limited to finding probable cause in individual cases, and his questioning of witnesses may cover a broad range of activities not relevant to a particular defendant, unlimited discovery of witnesses’ testimony could hamper the grand juror’s ongoing investigation. This simply underscores one weakness of this unique procedure.
¶19We cannot condone the limitation of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in order to promote or preserve this singular procedure.
¶20The constitutionality of a system whereby a judge accuses a person of crime may not withstand our re-examination. This question was neither briefed nor argued in this case so we will not here consider it. Until we do, we are obliged to limit our attention to the questions raised.
¶21We hold today that a person accused of a crime by any grand jury has the right to a transcript of his testimony and such parts of the record, including the testimony of other witnesses before the grand jury touching on the issue of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. To obtain it he must petition the circuit court of the county wherein the grand jury was impaneled therefor.
¶22In order to implement the procedure for obtaining custody of the material requested, we are today publishing a court rule. The rule provides that upon receipt of such petition the circuit judge shall direct the person having custody of the records to deliver same to him.
¶23*716The circuit judge shall thereupon examine the record and supply that material requested to the petitioner and cause the rest of the record to he returned to the custody of the person from whom the judge obtained it.
¶24The Bench and Bar are hereby advised that the provisions of MCLA 767.19g; MSA 28.959(7) are hereby superceded (See Perin v Peuler [on rehearing], 373 Mich 531, 541 [1964]).
¶25It is our determination that there is a need for immediate action and accordingly we dispense with the notice requirements of GCR 1963, 933.
¶26This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.