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386 So. 2d 293

Docket No. 80-319.

State v. Sesler

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Carnell SESLER, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1980-07-23

Relies on 360 So. 2d 774 - D'ALESSANDRO v. Shearer · 357 So. 2d 469 - State v. Opitz

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1980-07-23

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently February 2009

13 state decisions

70198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

¶2Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.

¶3SCHEB, Chief Judge.

¶4The state contends that the trial court erred in refusing to impose the mandatory three-year minimum sentence upon Sesler under Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1979). We agree.

¶5In September of 1979, the state charged Sesler with aggravated battery. A jury *294 found him guilty of aggravated assault with a firearm, a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery. The court withheld adjudication and ordered a presentence investigation. At the sentencing hearing, the state requested that the court sentence Sesler pursuant to Section 775.087(2). The court declined, explaining that because the victim had been partially at fault, it would be a "miscarriage of justice" to imprison Sesler for three years. The court then placed Sesler on five years probation. The court erred because Section 775.087(2) clearly requires a trial court to sentence a defendant convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm to a minimum of three years in prison. See D'Alessandro v. Shearer,360 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1978); State v. Opitz,357 So.2d 469 (Fla.2d DCA 1978).

¶6While we recognize the problems inherent in the uniform imposition of a minimum sentence, this area is a matter of legislative prerogative and is nondiscretionary. Accordingly, we have no alternative but to remand to the trial court with directions to vacate the prior sentence and impose sentence as required by Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1979).

¶7BOARDMAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur.

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