Gibson v. Ortiz’s Empirical Analysis
387 F.3d 812 · 2004
Citation profile
24 federal appellate · 4 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Williams v. Taylor · In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Estelle v. McGuire · Sullivan v. Louisiana
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial. This evidence, if believed, may be considered by you for the ... limited purpose of determining if it tends to show the existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged. For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant engaged in a sexual offense on one or more occasions other than that charged in this case. “Sexual offense” means a crime under the laws of a state or of the United States that involves ... any conduct made criminal by Penal Code Section 288(a) and 243 point 4. If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit the same or similar type of sexual offense. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused. Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Mendez v. Knowles · Byrd v. Lewis“When a court gives the jury instructions that allow it to convict a defendant on an impermissible legal theory, as well as a theory that meets constitutional requirements, “the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In Sullivan, the trial court gave the jury a definition of reasonable doubt that had previously been held unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). In invalidating Sullivan’s conviction because of the unconstitutional standard of proof, the Supreme Court tied the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, holding that “the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” A Sullivan error precludes harmless error review because no verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment has been rendered.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Doe v. Busby
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.