Spence v. Gormley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 2 district · 50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"As will be seen, we are not persuaded that 'personal responsibility’ is a constitutional prerequisite to eviction for the acts of household members. Nevertheless, we prefer to read the statute in a way that will avoid constitutional doubts. [Citation.] This is not to say that we endorse, in our construction of § 32, the tenants’ proposal that the BHA cannot terminate their tenancies without affirmative proof that they knew or had reason to know of their sons’ violent propensities, and were able to control their sons’ conduct. Cf. Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 592 , 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962). The requirement we discern in § 32 is not so broad. When the wrongdoer is a household member, a fair inference exists that the tenant is aware of potential problems, and able to exercise some influence or otherwise prevent violent and destructive conduct on the premises. Problems of unfairness arise only because this may not hold true in every case. Accordingly, we understand the 'cause’ requirement of § 32 simply to mean that a tenant should not be evicted if special circumstances are present to negate the inference that she could have averted the lease violation. In other words, if the tenant can show that she could not have foreseen and prevented her son’s violence, there is no 'cause’ to evict her within § 32.” Spence, 387 Mass, at 264-65, 439 N.E.2d at 745-46 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 5 Haw. App. 325 - Williams v. Hawaii Housing Authority · 257 Ill. App. 3d 417 - Diversified Realty Group, Inc. v. Davis

2. “"[WJhen the only justification for a legal burden, penalty, or classification is to punish or deter conduct, the burden cannot fairly be imposed on individuals who have no means of avoiding it. If punishment or deterrence is directed toward individuals who cannot affect the offending conduct, it is illogical. If it is directed toward the wrongdoer, whom the government hopes to reach through its action toward those close to him, it may be logical and effective, but it may also be contrary to basic justice. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 220, 102 S.Ct. [2382,] 2396-97 [, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)]; Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra at 175, 92 S.Ct. at 1406.” 439 N.E.2d at 748 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re James D. · 89 Md. App. 762 - In Re William George T.

3. “We stated in Spence v. Reeder, 382 Mass. 398 , [421], Mass. Adv. Sh. (1981) 229, 252-53, 416 N.E.2d 914 , that at least when a tenant knows or has reason to know of a household member’s violent tendencies, “[t]he notion that interference with or threats to the rights of other tenants justifying eviction can only come from a signatory of the lease (or his or her minor children) is itself illogical. Surely, a public housing authority cannot be left helpless to rectify a serious threat to the safety of other tenants simply because the signatory of the lease happens not to be the source of the threat.” Although we were concerned in Spence, not with construction of a lease, but with general questions of fairness, our comments there are relevant to the likely intent of parties seeking to provide rationally for a means to curtail rampant violence in the housing projects.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 5 Haw. App. 325 - Williams v. Hawaii Housing Authority