x999-1" type="majority">T. G. Kavanagh, J.

Plaintiff purchased a lot with a cottage on it on Whitmore Lake in the summer of 1965. At the time of this purchase the cottage was vacant and in need of various repairs. Certain of these repairs were performed by plaintiff that summer. The following year plaintiff applied to the Northfield Township for a building permit in order to repair the structure’s foundation which had become unsafe over the years due to runoff rain from the road in front of the cottage. He was informed no permit would be issued him as his lot size did not conform to the minimum necessary footage for building purposes.

Plaintiff commenced mandamus proceedings in Washtenaw County Circuit Court to compel issuance of the permit.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that while the lot size did not conform to the township ordinance use for a cottage it qualified as a nonconforming use having been so used prior to the passage of the zoning laws of the township, and plaintiff was therefore entitled to the permit.

Defendant’s answer relied on Northfield Township Ordinance, art V, § 5.04, which reads:

“NON-CONFORMING USE — TERMINATION OF:

“When a non-conforming use of building or land is discontinued through vacancy, lack of operation *383or otherwise, for a continuous period of three (3) months, thereafter no right shall exist to maintain on said property a non-conforming use.”

The defendants contended that pursuant to that section because the premises in question had remained vacant for the period of three months the prior nonconforming use was lost because of abandonment.

Testimony was received from several township officials as well as plaintiff. The trial court found the prior nonconforming use of the premises had been abandoned by his grantor pursuant to § 5.04, supra. Further, the court found the township was not estopped from claiming loss of nonconforming-use status because it had failed to record the required record of such status loss for the doctrine that the plaintiff is presumed to know the law.

The Court of Appeals reversed holding the trial court inappropriately applied the “presumed knowledge of the law” doctrine in this case and said further:

“ * * * the township board and the zoning board cannot wilfully ignore an important part of its own ordinance and thereby deprive plaintiff of rights conferred by another part of the same ordinance.”

This Court granted defendants leave to appeal.

On appeal the defendants pose two questions:

I. Does the failure of township officials to comply with the requirements of §§ 7.01 and 7.02 of the Northfield Township Zoning Ordinance estop defendants and their respective municipalities from asserting that plaintiff’s nonconforming use was discontinued or abandoned under § 5.04 of the same ordinance ?

II. Has plaintiff demonstrated the clear legal right necessary to entitle him to obtain a writ of mandamus ?

*384We agree with the defendants that the failure of the municipal officials to follow the recording requirements of the ordinance should not be held to estop them from enforcing the other provisions of the ordinance.

What we find controlling, however, is the trial judge’s finding that plaintiff’s grantor had abandoned the nonconforming use of the premises.

Section 5.04 speaks of the termination of status when the nonconforming use is “discontinued”.

“In interpreting the term ‘discontinued’ the courts take a very liberal attitude toward the restrictive nature of the provisions in zoning regulations dealing with the resumption of nonconforming uses and hold that the word ‘discontinued’ is synonymous with ‘abandoned.’ ” 18 ALR2d 725, § 3, p 729.

The trial court recognized this and found the “property was abandoned”.

“ ‘Abandonment’ of property or a right is the voluntary relinquishment thereof by its owner or holder, with the intention of terminating his ownership, possession, and control, and without vesting ownership in any other person.” 1 CJS, Abandonment, § 1, p 4 (emphasis added).

The necessary elements of “abandonment” are intent and some act or omission on the part of the owner or holder which clearly manifests his voluntary decision to abandon.

It has been stated:

“ * * * asa general rule that the abandonment of a nonconforming use and the consequent termination of any legal right thereto results, generally speaking, from a concurrence of facts, circumstances, and the intention of the owner of the premises or other person entitled to the use.” 18 ALR2d, 725, § 4, p 730, and cases cited thereat.

*385And further:

“Since intention is a necessary element in the concept of abandonment, it follows that lapse of time is not per se decisive of whether a nonconforming use has been abandoned, it being merely one of the factors which may evidence such an intention.” Ibid, at 731.

Additionally it may be stated:

“ * * * as a well-settled rule that a temporary cessation of a nonconforming use or the temporary vacancy of buildings used for a nonconforming use does not in itself operate to effect abandonment of the nonconforming use, where the circumstances, conditions, and statements of the owner are consistent with or evidence of an intention not to abandon the nonconforming use.” 18 ALR2d 725, § 6, p 733, citing “Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co. (1928) 245 Mich 261, 222 NW 86; Civic Asso. of Dearborn v. Horowitz (1947) 318 Mich 333, 28 NW2d 97.”

The defense in this case is grounded on that which plaintiff’s grantor, Mrs. Leece, did or did not do. Mr. Hanselman, defendant city building inspector, testified he had observed the premises on many occasions and because of the nonoccupancy and the state of disrepair of the property he concluded it was abandoned. His testimony together with the terms of the ordinance led the trial court to conclude the property had been abandoned.

In its opinion the trial court also stated that the then owner, Mrs. Leece, attempted to give the property to the township. There is no competent evidence in the record to support this statement.

The intent of Mrs. Leece was the crucial non-proved element of this cause. She was not called as a witness, and while intention to abandon can be inferred, facts which would support this inference must be established. There are none in this record.

*386We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated herein.

Costs to the plaintiff.

T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black and T. E. Brennan, JJ., concurred with T. Gr. Kavanagh, J.

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