387 Pa. Super. 340 - Smith v. Celotex Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401 , 43 A.2d 142 (1945), the Supreme Court established that impeachment of an expert witness by demonstrating partiality to the party for whom the expert is testifying is permissible. The Court stated: Whatever tends to show the interest or feeling of a witness in a cause is competent by way of cross-examination .... The fact that an expert witness is to receive, or has received, per diem compensation beyond the legal witness fee does not affect his competency as a witness, and it may have very slight bearing upon the question of his impartiality. Nevertheless, his relation to the party calling him may be such as to warrant the jury in taking it into consideration in weighing his testimony. Id. at 406 , 43 A.2d at 144 (quoting Duffy v. Griffith, 134 Pa.Super. 447 , 4 A.2d 170 (1939)). Thus, it is proper to elicit from an expert the fee he is being paid to testify. Accord Zamsky v. Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh, 378 Pa. 38 , 105 A.2d 335 (1954). Later decisions have farther indicated that it is also proper to elicit whether a personal friendship exists between the expert and either the party calling him or that party’s counsel. Downey v. Weston, 451 Pa. 259 , 301 A.2d 635 (1973).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 452 Pa. Super. 158 - Tiburzio-Kelly v. Montgomery · 1999 Pa. Super. 82 - Coward v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

2. ““Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant. Restatement (Second) of Torts §908(2) (1965). See also, Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484 , 555 A.2d 58, 69 (1989); Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors Inc., 521 Pa. 97 , 555 A.2d 800 (1989); Martin v. Johns Manville Corp., 508 Pa. 154, 168 , 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (1985) (plurality); Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 344 , 192 A.2d 355, 358 (1963). “The reckless disregard of the rights of others that is required under section 908 is further explained by section 500 of the Restatement, which defines ‘reckless disregard’ as follows: “The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. Restatement (Second) of Torts §500 (1965). “Thus, as the Supreme Court opined in Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383 , 485 A.2d 742 (”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Himmelreich v. Baugher Insurance Agency

3. “The evidence deemed insufficient in Martin was testimony by two doctors concerning what the medical profession knew of the risks posed to appliers of finished asbestos products and when they knew it.Justice Hutchinson ... emphasized that plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence of the awareness of the defendants of the specific risks associated with application of finished asbestos products, as opposed to risks associated with the manufacture of asbestos products. Justice Hutchinson distinguished those cases where the plaintiffs were employees of manufacturers of asbestos products and produced evidence of the specific knowledge of the defendants as to the risks posed to manufacturing employees such as the plaintiffs long before the defendants took any measures to protect the employees. See, e.g. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Inc., 662 F.Supp. 64, 70-71 (E.D.Pa.1987).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sealover v. Carey Canada