Miller v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

83 federal appellate · 14 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 120 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[t]he local board did not deal with the alleged facts or evidence of appellant’s conscientious objector form as a question of whether this legally could provide basis for a reopening to be made, so as to entitle consideration and evaluation to be engaged in thereafter under the general classification procedure of the regulations. It shortcut the situation by directly proceeding, without purporting to reopen, to a consideration of whether appellant was entitled to a conscientious objector classification on the merits of the probative elements of its file. It weighed the information contained in appellant’s form against other probative factors * * * and arrived at the judgment that he was not in truth a conscientious objector but was merely ‘seeking to avoid induction.' “This was action amounting to a determination of the question of classification.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Petrie v. United States · United States v. Grier

2. “[I]t would constitute a violation of due process for a local board to be able to handle prima-facie conscientious-objector claims in such different modes as to deprive one claimant of the statutory right of appeal (as well as the regulational rights of appearing and being heard) and to leave another claimant with these incidents.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Petrie v. United States · United States v. Jacques

3. ““We do not believe that such a power, to engage in a general consideration and evaluation and then to accord the result a summary status only, can be harmonized with the provisions and purposes of §§ 1625.2 and 1625.11. But if such an implied power can be regarded as being intended to exist under the regulations, then it must be held, we think, that the discrimination which the board effects against a conscientious objector claimant by dealing with his situation on this basis, as opposed to another such claimant of similar prima facie situation to whom it accords a reopening, would be a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. “In the latter situation, a conscientious objector claimant would be left with the procedural rights to appear, be heard, and take an appeal, while in the first situation there would be a foreclosure of these substantial incidents to a similar claimant. For a local board to be able to effect a discrimination of such substance between prima facie situations of legal equality facially would seem to us to constitute a matter of basic unfairness and hence to be, in the language of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , 499, 74 S.Ct. 693 , 694, 98 L.Ed. 884 , and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 , 168, 84 S.Ct. 1187 , 1190, 12 L.Ed. 2d 218 , ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process’.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Petrie v. United States