388 F. Supp. 2d 489 - Thomas v. Beard’s Empirical Analysis
2005
Citation profile
6
cited by 6 later decisions
2
states following
July 2009
most recently cited
1 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Johnson v. Zerbst · Williams v. Taylor · North Carolina v. Alford
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"The Commonwealth argues that any assertable deficiency of defense counsel in investigating possible lines of a mitigation defense at the sentencing phase cannot constitute a cognizable instance of ineffective assistance of counsel for the reason that Thomas directed counsel not to argue in mitigation. Thomas does not deny that he so advised counsel, and the record reflects that Thomas, in colloquy, even expressed such a desire to the trial judge. But while `[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions,' Strickland , 466 U.S. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , not every such waiver is constitutionally valid. "As the Supreme Court made plain more than sixty years ago, `[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver . . . must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The Court has examined this requirement in several contexts, most notably with respect to a defendant's guilty plea. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 31 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (`The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative cours”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Whitehead v. State“"Courts have extended this standard to waivers of the right to present mitigating evidence, see, e.g., Wilkins v. Bowersox , 145 F.3d 1006 , 1015-1016 (8th Cir.1998), and it is clear that such a waiver cannot be knowingly and intelligently made in the absence of full information about the nature of one's choices. `First, counsel's duty to investigate reasonably and inform and advise his client must be fulfilled before either the lawyer or his client can decide what evidence to present; if counsel failed to investigate and advise, then Petitioner's waiver was not knowing and intelligent and thus without legal effect' Holloway [v. Horn] , 161 F.Supp.2d [452 ,] 569 [(E.D.Pa.2001)] (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds, 355 F.3d 707 (3d Cir.2004). As the Third Circuit has squarely held, the absence of an informed decision vitiates an otherwise valid waiver. See United States v. Gray , 878 F.2d [702 ,] 712 [(3d Cir.1982)]. The court in Gray expressly held that a defendant's reluctance to subpoena witnesses could not act as a waiver of his right to have those witnesses testify, as this reluctance was based on inaccurate information — counsel did not know, and therefore failed to inform the defendant, that subpoenaed witnesses were entitled to compensation for their expenses. Id. `This therefore is not a case in which the defendant made an informed decision which precluded counsel from having a duty to pursue a given line of investigation.' Id. "Indeed, as several courts have sug”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Whitehead v. State“[THOMAS’ COUNSEL]: Mr. Thomas, you recall during the case in chief that we inquired as to whether or not you wanted to testify on your own behalf. Do you recall that? [THOMAS]: Yeah, I do. Why do I answer all these questions before? We done be over that already. No, I don’t want to get on the stand. THE COURT: Well, this is a different portion. [THOMAS]: I still don’t want to get on the stand. THE COURT: Under no conditions? [THOMAS]: No. THE COURT:, Is this your decision? [THOMAS]: Yes, it is. THE COURT: Did you discuss it with your lawyer, Mr. Watson? - [THOMAS]: Yes. THE COURT: And you already told him, I would like to repeat, but it’s your decision not to take the stand at this penalty stage of the hearing or even to present any evidence. Is that your independent and voluntary decision? [THOMAS]: It is.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Thomas v. Horn
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.