Levy v. Levy’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The statute permitting a husband or wife to sue in equity for separate maintenance restricts relief to cases where the living separate and apart is without fault of the party seeking redress. Thus, in Bielby v. Bielby, 333 Ill. 478 , the applicable principles are plainly stated as follows: ‘To maintain a bill for separate maintenance by a wife against her husband she must not only show that she has good cause for living separate and apart from him but also that such separation was without fault on her part, and if she voluntarily consents to a separation, or is guilty of failure of duty or of misconduct materially contributing to the destruction of the marital relation, she is not without fault within the meaning of the statute. ’ In view of the above outlined repeated acts of cruelty and improper conduct by Mrs. Levy, she was clearly not without fault in causing the plaintiff to leave the home as he did on August 4, 1942. Dr. Levy, of course, continues to be liable for the proper support, care and education of the two minor children of this marriage, under other appropriate statutes.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 344 Ill. App. 233 - Elston v. Elston

2. ““However, it should by no means be construed as subjecting a husband to one degree of cruelty or mistreatment and a wife to quite another. Our statute requires proof of ‘extreme and repeated cruelty’ and obviously ‘ slight acts of violence ’ are not extreme as to a normal person whether husband or wife. “It is true that the physical condition of the parties involved must be taken into account and each case considered upon its own facts. Thus, while a light slap ordinarily would not constitute extreme cruelty as to the average, healthy person the same act might well have a different effect upon one who is quite frail or an invalid. It is only in this respect that we might differentiate acts of cruelty or calibrate marital violence in degrees.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 342 Ill. App. 140 - Mason v. Mason

3. ““. . . that in suits for divorce on the grounds of cruelty no different principles of law or rules of evidence can be applied where the husband is plaintiff than where the wife is plaintiff. Both parties are governed by the same statute which draws no distinction because of sex but in fact states that a divorce may be had where ‘either party . . . has been guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty.’ Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 40, sec. 1.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 342 Ill. App. 140 - Mason v. Mason