Downes v. Downes’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

57 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Our predominant mission is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if possible, from the language of the statute (or Rule) itself. If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for legislative intent ends and we apply the language as written and in a commonsense manner. We do not add words or ignore those that are there. If there is any ambiguity, we may then seek to fathom the legislative intent by looking at legislative history and applying the most relevant of the various canons that courts have created.”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lamone v. Schlakman · 198 Md. App. 551 - Stephens v. State

2. “We begin our analysis by looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shealer v. Straka · Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

3. “case-within-a-case” methodology permit a court to speculate about what might have happened in the absence of a lawyer’s negligence? (3) Did the lower court err in reversing the trial court’s determination that Respondent’s negligence was the proximate cause of Petitioner’s damages? 3 . The language of then-Section 3-203(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article is now codified at Section 3-203(b) of that same Article. See Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl. VoL, 2009 Suppl.) § 3-203(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article. 4 . Whiteford proposes that Downes did not immediately challenge the first extension because, at that point, he did not know whether Suder would disclaim the will to his detriment. By the time Downes decided to intervene, he had no "need to object to the first extension as there [was] no set of circumstances where the court would have concluded that the fifth extension was valid[.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Suder v. Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, LLP