Moore v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Although the failure of a single bill in the General Assembly may be due to many reasons, and thus is not always a good indication of the Legislature’s intent, under some circumstances, the failure to enact legislation is persuasive evidence of legislative intent. See, e.g., Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 255-256 , 863 A.2d 297, 303-304 (2004); Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 504 , 860 A.2d 886, 895 (2004) (‘The Legislature [has] declined invitations to modify the rule as [appellant] wishes’); Stearman v. State Farm, 381 Md. 436, 455 , 849 A.2d 539, 550-551 (2004) (‘The refusal of the Legislature to act to change a [statute] ... provides ... support for the Court to exercise restraint and refuse to step in and make the change’); In re Anthony R., supra, 362 Md. [51], 65-67, 763 A.2d [136], 144-145 (2000); State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 723-724 , 728 A.2d 712, 717-718 (1999) (‘We have recognized that the General Assembly’s failure to amend ... sometimes reflects its desired public policy’); State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 723 , 720 A.2d 311, 318 (1998) (‘Therefore, by declining to adopt the proposed language of the amending bill, the Legislature clearly did not intend’ to adopt the result being urged); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 459 , 470 A.2d 1269, 1288 (1984) (‘All of these proposals [supporting different views of a statute advocated by the parties] were rejected by the General Assembly’).””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Yonga v. State · Potomac Valley Orthopaedic Associates v. Maryland State Board of Physicians

2. ““By Maryland common law, the attempt to commit a crime is, itself, a separate crime—a misdemeanor. As we pointed out in Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 330-31 , 534 A.2d 1333, 1335 (1988), attempt ‘is an adjunct crime, it cannot exist by itself, but only in connection with another crime,’ and it thus ‘expands and contracts and is redefined commensurately with the substantive offense.’ See also Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124 , 482 A.2d 474 (1984). Subject to some exceptions, common law attempt has been held applicable to common law crimes and to a number of statutory offenses. Bruce v. State, 317 Md. 642, 645 , 566 A.2d 103, 104 (1989). There are, however, at least two categories of substantive crimes, to which criminal attempt has been held inapplicable. The first consists of crimes that do not require at least a general criminal intent. Cox v. State, supra, 311 Md. at 331 , 534 A.2d at 1335 : ‘There is an exception, however, to the general rule that attempt applies to all offenses. Crimes that do not involve intent to do a criminal act generally fall outside the scope of the crime of attempt. If there is no intent to do a wrongful act, then usually there is no crime of attempt.’ The second category consists of substantive crimes that are, themselves, in the nature of attempts. Simple assault is often cited as an example. Although we need not decide the matter here, there may be other crimes as well that may not be suitable for serving as the basis of a criminal attempt.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 168 Md. App. 1 - Maxwell v. State

3. “Preliminarily, it is questionable whether count two of the indictment [the charge of attempted third degree sexual offense] even covered the State’s theory of the case. Count two flatly charged that the defendant, in Frederick County, “did unlawfully attempt to commit a sexual offense in the third degree upon a fourteen year old minor.” (Emphasis added). Under the agreed statement of facts, there was no evidence of a fourteen-year-old minor present at the location in Frederick County or even a fourteen year old ever involved in the case. The language of count two may simply not cover an adult or fictitious person believed by the defendant to be a minor. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that count two is sufficient to embrace the State’s theory, we agree with the defendant that the crime of an attempted third degree sexual offense under the common law and under § 3-307(a)(4) and (5), does not cover the situation presented by this case. In reaching our decision, however, we need not and shall not decide some of the issues raised by the defendant. Specifically, we shall not reach either the defendant’s argument that there was no “substantial step that goes beyond preparation” or his argument based on “legal impossibility.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 168 Md. App. 1 - Maxwell v. State