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388 So. 2d 15

Docket No. 79-1858.

Watson v. State

Thomas WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided September 3, 1980.

Rehearing Denied October 8, 1980.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1980-09-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“while the fact of probation does not imply a total forfeiture of a probationer's privilege against self-incrimination, it does qualify this right.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including EP v. State

Relies on Greene v. Massey · Grubbs v. State · 343 So. 2d 13 - State v. Heath

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1980-09-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently March 2005

12 state decisions

60198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*16 Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Joseph Atterbury, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Max Rudmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Watson, defendant in the trial court, appeals the revocation of his probation. We affirm.

¶5The sole issue on this appeal is whether a probationer may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to justify his refusal to answer questions at a probation violation hearing regarding non-criminal conduct alleged to constitute the violation of probation. We answer in the negative.

¶6Defendant was charged with violating his probation by moving from an approved residence without the consent of his probation officer. At the probation violation hearing, he was called as a witness by the State and asked how long he had remained at the approved residence, whether he had informed anyone that he was leaving the residence, and where he had resided after leaving the residence. Watson objected to each of these questions citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The court, however, required the defendant to answer. Thus, Watson's own testimony was used to prove the allegation that he violated his probation.

¶7While the fact of probation does not imply a total forfeiture of a probationer's privilege against self-incrimination, it does qualify this right. Grubbs v. State,373 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1979). Specifically, it has been held that a probationer's Fifth Amendment privilege is not infringed upon by requiring him to provide information necessary for his supervision, including his place of residence, and to explain his non-criminal conduct. State v. Heath,343 So.2d 13 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893, 98 S.Ct. 269, 54 L.Ed.2d 179 (1977). Moreover, when a probationer refuses to testify concerning compliance with the terms of probation relevant to residence, the judge may consider this factor in a revocation hearing. State v. Mangam,343 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1977). In fact, the court may properly infer non-compliance, and thus a violation of the condition of probation, from the probationer's silence. Id.

¶8Accordingly, we find that the trial court acted properly in requiring the defendant to testify. A substantial violation of probation having been established, the order of revocation is

¶9Affirmed.

¶10MOORE, BERANEK and HURLEY, JJ., concur.

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