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← 389 FSUPP2D 278 - United States v. Perry

United States v. Perry’s Empirical Analysis

2005

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
April 2019
most recently cited

16 federal appellate · 2 district ·

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3553 · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 849 (§ 409 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 851 (§ 411 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 860 (§ 419 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 994

Relies on United States v. Booker · Blakely v. Washington · Blockburger v. United States · Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois · Smith v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “cocaine base” without specifying how broadly that term should be interpreted, the Commission clarified in 1993 (in response to diverging opinions from different courts of appeal, including our own) that cocaine base was to be interpreted as referring only to crack. See United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, May 2002 (”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “there is no persuasive penological or scientific justification for treating 1 gram of crack the same as 100 grams of powder. The Sentencing Commission studied the issue in depth and concluded that the assumptions underlying the disparity between crack and powder are unsupported. Specifically, the Commission concluded that: (1) the prevalence of aggravating factors in crack cases does not differ substantially from powder cocaine cases; (2) any pharmacological differences between crack and powder do not justify the disparity in penalties; (3) in comparison to the mid-80s, the use of crack has decreased; (4) the unjustifiably harsh crack penalties disproportionately impact on black defendants and have increased racial disparity in federal sentencing, contrary to one of the Sentencing Reform Act’s primary goals; (5) the disparity in sentences involving crack and powder brings irrationality into the criminal justice system, allowing guideline sentences to vary widely depending on whether the offender had cooked the powder into crack by the time of arrest; and (6) the 100:1 ratio results in lesser sentences for large scale suppliers of powder cocaine than the street level crack dealers who exist below them in the hierarchy of distri bution. Thus, none of the previously-offered reasons for the 100:1 ratio withstand scrutiny. In light of these well-supported findings by the Commission, a court acts well within its discretion under § 3553(a) in sentencing below the guideline range to ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “Now sentencing courts must consider this disparity in the context of the § 3553 factors and must also vary from the Guideline range if the Guideline sentence is not consonant with the purposes of § 3553.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.