¶1Sagar Navin Patel sues Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officer Boe Dennett for excessive force and free-speech violations arising out of an altercation on Paradise Boulevard in Las Vegas. Dennett moves for summary judgment. Because there are genuine disputes of material fact about whether Dennett used excessive force in response to Patel's exercise of his free-speech rights, and because Dennett is not entitled to qualified immunity, I deny the motion.
¶2Background
¶3On April 4, 2014, Patel, an Indian-American man, traveled to Las Vegas with several of his family members for a bachelor party.
¶4A. Dennett's account
¶5Dennett testified that he and Smith first observed Patel yelling obscenities and attempting to enter a closed business.
¶6Dennett rolled down the passenger-side window of Smith's patrol car and told Patel to go home.
¶7While Dennett approached Patel, Smith approached Patel's group to keep them separated from Patel and Dennett. Patel resisted as Dennett escorted him to the patrol car, so Dennett put Patel into a "handcuffing arm lock."
¶8Dennett testified that when they arrived at the patrol car, Patel pushed backwards against Dennett, then immediately "leaped" forward.
¶9*892Patel continued to resist while Smith was holding him down waiting for the medical team to respond.
¶10B. Patel's account
¶11Patel testified that he never attempted to enter any closed businesses, and that he was just frustrated with his group's inability to find a place to eat on Paradise Boulevard.
¶12Dennett and Smith then made a U-turn and stopped about ten feet in front of Patel. When Dennett got out of the car, Patel got scared because Dennett looked angry.
¶13Dennett took Patel to the patrol car and kept repeating "he's resisting," "he's resisting."
¶14*893C. Patel's injury and treatment
¶15Both parties agree that Patel was treated by paramedics and brought to the University Medical Center (UMC). UMC records reflect that Patel "was being placed in handcuffs, subsequently had movement of the left arm when he was being placed, resulted in immediate onset of pain to his left arm."
¶16D. Medical expert opinions on the causation of Patel's injury
¶17Dennett's retained medical expert, Dr. Mark McKenzie, provided his medical opinion that that the type of fracture Patel suffered could not have been caused by an arm lock alone.
¶18E. Patel's criminal case
¶19On April 30, 2014, a summons was issued to Patel in the Las Vegas Justice Court on his disorderly-conduct and obstructing charges. On December 11, 2014, the obstructing charge was dismissed and Patel "submitted" to the disorderly conduct charge, which conditioned dismissal on Patel "staying out of trouble." The charge was eventually dismissed.
¶20F. Patel's claims
¶21Patel sues Dennett, alleging that Dennett violated his First Amendment rights, arrested him without probable cause, and used excessive force to effectuate the arrest. Dennett moves for summary judgment on all of Patel's claims.
¶22Discussion
¶23Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a *894matter of law."
¶24If the moving party satisfies Rule 56 by demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the party resisting summary judgment to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
¶25A. False-arrest claim
¶261. Smiddy immunity
¶27Dennett relies on the Smiddy v. Varney
¶282. Probable cause
¶29To prevail on a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must "demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest *895[him]."
¶30If a plaintiff was arrested for multiple offenses, the facts need only establish that probable cause existed for one offense.
¶31Dennett argues that he had probable cause to arrest Patel. He claims that, by "belligerently yelling at Dennett, Patel obstructed Dennett in his investigation of potential disorderly conduct."
¶32The Ninth Circuit found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest because there was no "legitimate, articulate reason" to detain Duran.
¶33In Velazquez v. City of Long Beach ,
¶34Velazquez and Duran direct my finding that, crediting Patel's testimony as true, Dennett is not entitled to qualified immunity on Patel's false-arrest claim. According to Patel's account of the incident, Patel was not acting so disorderly as to cause a scene in the area. He was walking in a largely commercial space, shouting to his friends who were 15-20 feet away, in an area prone to helicopters and commercial planes flying overhead, blocks away from the Las Vegas Strip, with a three-story building separating Patel and any residential buildings.
¶35Dennett attempts to bolster his argument for probable cause by attaching a crime report map from March 2017 to show that the incident area is a "high-crime area" and therefore further justifies police intervention when individuals are acting disorderly there.
¶36*897B. Excessive-force claim
¶37The Fourth Amendment prohibits police use of force that "is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness."
¶38The court's reasonableness inquiry, however, is not limited to these three factors alone. I must consider the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the arrest and weigh the gravity of the intrusion against the government's interest to determine whether the force employed was constitutionally reasonable.
¶39"Because the excessive force and false arrest factual inquiries are distinct, establishing a lack of probable cause to make an arrest does not establish an excessive force claim, and vice-versa."
¶40*898Dennett is also not entitled to qualified immunity for his use of force against Patel. The crimes Patel was (potentially unlawfully) arrested for were not severe. Patel was neither resisting arrest nor trying to evade arrest. There is no evidence in the record that Patel was a threat to the officers or anyone else. Patel testified that Dennett exerted enough pressure to break his arm, despite the fact that Patel was not resisting arrest. A reasonable officer could easily conclude that, under these circumstances, that amount of force was unreasonable.
¶41Dennett argues that his medical expert's opinion that Patel's arm couldn't have broken unless Patel resisted should demonstrate that: (1) Patel did, in fact, resist, and (2) that Dennett's use of force did not cause Patel's injury. But Patel's medical expert responded that, indeed, Patel's arm could have broken if Dennett held Patel's elbow and pulled his arm back. Which medical opinion is more credible, and which witnesses should be believed about how the event occurred, is for the jury to decide. There is sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Dennett's actions, not Patel's resistance, caused Patel's injury, and that Dennett's use of force was excessive. And Graham 's holding that force is only justified when there is a need for force would have put a prudent officer on notice that exerting enough force to break a non-resisting suspect's arm was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
¶42C. Free-speech claim
¶43Because I have determined above that there are questions of fact about whether Dennett arrested and punished Patel for engaging in speech that is protected by the First Amendment, I deny Dennett's request for summary judgment on this claim as well.
¶44Conclusion
¶45Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Boe Dennett's motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 22] is DENIED.
¶46ECF No. 22-1 at 12.
¶48ECF No. 22-2 at 5, 28.
¶49Id. at 5. Smith testified that she did not see Patel trying to enter any closed businesses. Id. at 31.
¶50ECF No. 22-3 at 5.
¶51ECF No. 22-2 at 5.
¶52Id. Smith and Hanks confirmed that Dennett told Patel to "go home" or something similar, although their accounts of this exchange differ somewhat. Compare ECF No. 22-2 at 5 (Dennett's account) with ECF No. 22-2 at 29-30 (Smith's account) and ECF No. 22-3 at 7 (Hanks's account).
¶53ECF No. 22-2 at 5.
¶56ECF No. 22-2 at 6.
¶59Id. at 32. Patel described the technique as Dennett pulling his left arm behind his back and to the right side. ECF No. 22-1 at 28.
¶62ECF No. 22-3 at 9.
¶63ECF No. 22-2 at 8.
¶66ECF No. 22-1 at 17.
¶67ECF No. 22-4 at 53.
¶69ECF No. 22-1 at 18.
¶71ECF No. 22-2 at 5 (Dennett's deposition); ECF No. 22-3 at 7 (Hanks's deposition).
¶72ECF No. 22-1 at 20, 25.
¶74ECF No. 22-4 at 52.
¶75ECF No. 22-2 at 32.
¶76ECF No. 22-1 at 26.
¶82ECF No. 22-3 at 27.
¶85See generallyid. at 32-59.
¶86See ECF No. 22-4 at 2-5.
¶89See generallyid. at 17-28.
¶90ECF No. 1.
¶91ECF No. 22.
¶93Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. , 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
¶94Warren v. City of Carlsbad , 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995) ; see alsoNw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994).
¶95Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
¶96Orr v. Bank of Am. , 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc. , 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991) ; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
¶97Smiddy v. Varney , 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981) (Smiddy I ); Smiddy v. Varney , 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Smiddy II ).
¶98ECF No. 22 at 16.
¶99Smiddy II , 803 F.2d at 1471 (emphasis added).
¶100Dennett also states that Patel "ratified the finding of probable cause when he entered a plea agreement ...." ECF No. 22 at 16. Dennett provides no support to show why this apparent "ratification" is meaningful. And it is disputed that Patel pleaded guilty at all. Rather, the records show that he "submitted" to the disorderly conduct charge, and that the charge would be dismissed if he "stayed out of trouble." According to the sworn affidavit of Patel's attorney, a submittal is a substitution for a plea and connotes a situation in which a plea is never entered. Rather, the court agrees to dismiss the case without the defendant ever having to enter a plea or sustain a conviction. ECF No. 25 at 49-50. Dennett offers no response to this explanation other than contending that Patel is overly concerned with "semantics." I disagree and do not take Patel's "submittal" into consideration.
¶101Norse v. City of Santa Cruz , 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park , 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) ).
¶102Lassiter v. City of Bremerton , 556 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) ).
¶103United States v. Collins , 427 F.3d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 2005).
¶104United States. v. Alaimalo , 313 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002).
¶105United States v. Magallon-Lopez , 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford , 543 U.S. 146, 153-55, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) ).
¶106SeeRamirez v. City of Buena Park , 560 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009).
¶108ECF No. 22 at 14.
¶109Duran v. City of Douglas , 904 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1990)
¶117Velazquez v. City of Long Beach , 793 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2015).
¶123See ECF No. 25 at 27-28. I, myself, am a Las Vegas native and officed in the area in question for many years. I would not describe the intersection of Paradise and Twain as a "residential area."
¶124ECF No. 22-2 at 5; see alsoid. at 30.
¶125See ECF No. 22-3 at 15-22.
¶126Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ; Fontana v. Haskin , 262 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
¶127Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency , 261 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ).
¶128Mattos v. Agarano , 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011).
¶129Smith v. City of Hemet , 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005).
¶130Mattos , 661 F.3d at 441.
¶131Blankenhorn v. City of Orange , 485 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside , 120 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 1997) ).
¶132Graham , 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865.
¶133Beier v. City of Lewiston , 354 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) ; see alsoMattos , 661 F.3d at 443 n.4 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that "any amount of force against her" was excessive if the officers did not have probable cause, as the absence of probable cause alone is insufficient to establish excessive force).
¶134Velazquez , 793 F.3d at 1024 (citing Arpin , 261 F.3d at 921-22 ).
¶136SeeBlankenhorn , 485 F.3d at 481 (holding that it was clearly established that gang-tackling and punching a relatively calm suspect who was not actively resisting arrest could violate the person's Fourth Amendment rights); see alsoDeorle v. Rutherford , 272 F.3d 1272, 1286 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It does not matter that no case of this court directly addresses the use of [a particular weapon]. We have held that an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is not clearly established every time a novel method is used to inflict injury.") (citation and quotations omitted).