People v. Ruggles

¶1I

¶2I respectfully dissent.

¶3The majority somewhat grudgingly concedes that the warrantless search of the briefcase was permissible under United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 824 [72 L.Ed.2d 572, 593, 102 S.Ct. 2157], and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, we are told that there was a violation of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution because “[e]ach day millions of Californians drive in automobiles, often taking with them, inside briefcases or other similar luggage, items of a highly personal or confidential nature.” This rationale for disagreeing with Rossis thoroughly misleading. Rossdoes not affect the millions of Californians men*14tioned by the majority, but the relatively few whose briefcases and tote bags happen to be found in cars which the police have probable cause to search.

¶4My guess is that for every Californian who drives around with “highly personal or confidential” items in a briefcase, there is another Californian who drives with confidential matters on, under or tucked inside a car seat, in the glove compartment, the map pocket, the trunk, the wheel-well or under the hood. The majority’s reasoning which relies solely on the number of potential searches, could therefore just as logically be the vehicle for the abandonment of our adherence to the Carroll principle that “because of their highly movable nature ‘automobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.’ [Citation.]” (People v. McKinnon (1972) 7 Cal.3d 899, 907-908 [103 Cal.Rptr. 897, 500 P.2d 1097].) Yet as I read part I of the majority opinion, it is a ringing endorsement of Carroll, as recently explained in People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (1983) 35 Cal.3d 11, 16 [196 Cal.Rptr. 359, 671 P.2d 863] and People v. Chavers (1983) 33 Cal.3d 462, 469 [189 Cal.Rptr. 169, 658 P.2d 96],

¶5II

¶6Of course, the fact that there are no state obstacles to the application of Carroll to automobile searches does not dispose of the problem of containers found in searchable automobiles. I submit that the container cases are of two types, differing fundamentally in principle and practical considerations. The majority has unfortunately fused the two into one.

¶7Type A is represented by the facts in United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [53 L.Ed.2d 538, 97 S.Ct. 2476] and Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753 [61 L.Ed.2d 235, 99 S.Ct. 2586], In each case probable cause was confined to the container—a footlocker in Chadwick, a green suitcase in Sanders. In each case the officers waited until the container had been placed inside a vehicle and then proceeded to make a warrantless search of the container. Clearly in each case the temporary presence of the container in a vehicle was fortuitous and did not relieve the officers of the duty of obtaining a warrant for the search—a duty to which they had been subject before the container was put on wheels. One vital characteristic of the type A situation is that the officers do not have probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself—as distinguished from the container—contains seizable material.

¶8*15In any event, as to type A Chadwickand Sandersremain good law and nothing in Rossquestions either case on its facts.1

¶9Type B is quite different. Here we start with probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself contains seizable matter. This matter may be anywhere—on or under a seat, in the glove compartment, the trunk or in various containers found in the vehicle. It is with respect to this type of situation that the United States Supreme Court first held in Robbins v. California (1981) 453 U.S. 420 [69 L.Ed.2d 744, 101 S.Ct. 2841] that closed containers found in vehicles could not be opened without a warrant, even though there was probable cause to search the vehicle itself. This is, of course, the holding which was abandoned in United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 823 [72 L.Ed.2d 572, 593, 102 S.Ct. 2157], in favor of the rule that “[t]he scope of a warrantless search [of a car] is no narrower— and no broader—than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize.”2

¶10Ill

¶11That this is a type B case needs no elaboration. Based on the informant’s tip, their own surveillance, and the things found in the passenger compartment of the car, the police had probable cause to believe that the car contained at least two weapons, handcuffs, as well as other evidence and instrumentalities of crime. Only with respect to one of the weapons was there cause to believe that it would be in a briefcase. Nothing specific had been learned about the tote bags. Since any of the other items for which the police were looking could have been in the briefcase along with the weapon, it is clear that under Rossthe police were as justified in searching that briefcase for those other items, as they were in searching the other containers in the *16car.3 I stress this simply to emphasize that to reach its result the majority must squarely disagree with Ross—as indeed it eventually does.

¶12I submit that the reasons for that disagreement are inadequate.

¶13IV

¶14Long before “container” problems arose in the wake of United States v. Chadwick, supra,433 U.S. 1, this court had no qualms about following Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42 [26 L.Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975] which upheld the warrantless search of a car which had been removed to the police station after the arrest of the occupants. Obviously the “mobility” of the vehicle was but a distant memory and one would suppose that the Carroll justification for a warrantless search—predicated on mobility— would no longer obtain. Nevertheless, a warrantless search at the station was permitted because, said the court, “[f]or constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.” Clearly the focus had now shifted from mobility to relative inconvenience: delay while the facts were presented to a magistrate as distinguished from immediate warrantless search.4

¶15This court has enthusiastically endorsed the Chambersrationale. (People v. Chavers (1983) 33 Cal.3d 462, 468-469 [189 Cal.Rptr. 169, 658 P.2d 96]; People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 749-753 [117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1]; Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 210, 223 [113 Cal.Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991]; People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 201-202 [104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145].)5 Its relevance becomes apparent when one considers the practical rationale for the Rossrule as explained by the court: “The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself (including its upholstery) could be searched without a warrant, with all wrapped articles and containers found during that search then taken to a magistrate. But *17prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests. Moreover, until the container itself was opened the police could never be certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus in every case in which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be directly inconsistent with the rationale supporting the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. ” (United States v. Ross, supra,456 U.S. at p. 822, fn. 28 [72 L.Ed.2d at pp. 591-592].)

¶16I find it hard to understand why an argument which this court accepted again and again in the Chamberssituation—that, for constitutional purposes, the necessary delay in submitting the probable cause issue to a magistrate was an intrusion equal to an immediate warrantless search—should fail to gain acceptance in the container context. The only explanation which readily comes to mind is the fallacy I tried to expose at the outset of this dissent— that the Rossrule will affect millions of Californians who drive around with confidential and private matters in containers of various kinds. I again point out that this is a gross exaggeration of the problem since—like so many officers whom the courts are forced to educate in constitutional niceties—it ignores the issue of probable cause.

¶17I would affirm.

¶18Beacom, J.,* concurred.