Austin v. Gagan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 8 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The statute means at any time before the defendant is required to answer by the laws of the state, when the time is specially regulated by the statutes, and by the general rules of practice governing the matter adopted by the courts, when the matter is thus regulated, instead of by specific statutes of the state — not within the time provided by special orders extending the time, or application by or stipulations of the parties” — citing Dixon v. Telegraph Co., 38 Fed. 377 , an earlier case also decided by the same distinguished jurist.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McDonald v. Hope Min. Co. · Tevis v. Palatine Ins.

2. ““It is provided that a defendant, seeking to remove a cause from a state court to the federal court, may file his petition and bond therefor in the state court at or before the time when he is required, by the laws of the state or the rule of the state court in which such suit is brought, to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of plaintiff. * * * Under the laws of this state [section 3552, Code of Iowa 1897] the defendant to an action brought in a court of record must” assail the petition by motion or demurrer, or take action “upon it by answer before noon of the second day of the term. By Code, § 3554, the court is authorized to extend the time for filing any pleading beyond that fixed by the statute, having due regard to making up the issues at the earliest time practicable. In the case at bar, it will be observed that the application for removal was not filed until some.30 days after the second day of the term; but it is the claim of the appellant that the granting of further time to plead to the.petition had the effect to extend the time in which application for a removal to the federal court could properly be made. * * * It is to he conceded that this proposition finds support in the decisions of some of the inferior federal courts, but we are persuaded that it is clearly against the weight of authority, and cannot be upheld by any fair construction of the federal statute. There is but one time fixed by our Code before which the defendant duly served with not”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Waverly Stone & Gravel Co. v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co.

3. ““One ground of Uie motion is that the petition does not present a ease, which appears from the facts stall'd, to arise' under the laws of the United Stales. One party claims the land in dispute as a homestead, and the other that the land is mineral, and therefore not subject to be entered as a homestead: but it does not appear from any facts stated that there is any disputed construction of either statute under which the respective parties claim. For anything that appears, both parties may agree ns to the construction of the statutes, and the whole case turns upon a question of fact, as to whether the land is mineral land or not. or whether ('it tier party has performed ihe acts conceded to be necessar.v to give the right claimed. Indeed, 1 infer from the facts stated in the petition that the contest will ready be upon the facts, and not the law. In my judgment the record does not present a case for removal under the decisions,” etc.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Nelson v. Southern Ry. Co.