THE JACOB BRAliDOW.
831
the borrowing of money on the credit of his vessel, what he afterwards does with the money is not material to the creation of a maritime lien. Subrogation is not the bnsis of the maritime liens given a lender of money to the captain of a vessel, and such a cloctrineis not sustained either by reason or authority. The libelants, M. Nippert & Co., have a maritime lien on the tow-boat Williams, her tackle, etc., for their entire advances, except the $2,000 sent to the Grand Coal Com pany, and may have an order withdrawing from the registry the amount of their said advances, with interests and costs.
THE JACOB BRANDOW. SCHIAYI<'INO v. THE JACOB BRANDOW. (District Court, D. South Carolina. TOWAGE-DuTIES AND LIABILITIES OF
July 3, 1889.)
TUGs. A tug. with a bark in tow, the master of the latter having been expressly instructed to follow the course of the tug. proceeded obliquely across a stream to within a short distance of the bank. then changed its course, and. without further direction to the bark, proceeded parallel with the bank. The bark. though in full sight of the tug's change of course. continued on the oblique course, and ran ashore. Held, that the tug was not liable for the damages.
In Admiralty. Libel fer damages caused by negligence of tug. J. P. K. Bryan, for libelant. J. N. Nathans, for respondent. SIMONTON, J. The Cassabona came to this port with a cargo of sulphur for the Etiwan Phosphate Company. The company engaged the tug Brandow to tow the bark up Cooper river, to its works on Ship-Yard creek. This creek-about 150 feet wide-runs into Cooper river between mud-banks, which are covered with salt marsh to the water's edge. It has several bends in it. Just before the Etiwan landing is reached, there is a considerable bend. In order to pass it, vessels go nearly to the opposite bank, coming into full view of the landing. There they change their course obliquely across the creek, and, approaching the bank at a point about 700 feet from the landing, proceed on a course parallel to, the bank of the creek, straight to the landing. When the tug took hold of the bark her master instructed the interpreter who had been engaged to translate his orders that the bark must follow the course of the tug. He then, with a tow-line 180 feet proceeded up Cooper river with the bark, and turned into and up Ship-Yard creek. During the towing, the master of the bark, with his interpreter, stood on the forward part of the bark, in easy hearing distance. The tug-master gave such orders ashe deemed necessary, which were at once interpreted to the master. The latter extended them to the men at the wheel,-the mate and a seaman. No orders were given but such as came from the tug. Nothing of importance happened until the last bend was reached. This bend was on their left. The tug, in advance, drawing some nine feet
832
FEDERAJ. REPORTER,
vol. 39.
rounded the bend as has been described. Then she changed direction. The bar,k, following, approached the opposite bank, and when she had approached sufficiently near she got orderf1 from the tug to change direction, and was put on the course obliquely across the creek. ·When the tug got within between 15 and 20 feet of the bank it straightened out on the course parallel to the bank, going to the landing. The bark pursued her oblique course without change, and approached the marsh within 15 feet. The tug-master, observing this, called out: "Where are you going? Have you no rudder on that bark? Port." Attempting to obey this order, the bark found herself aground. The tug, not being able to pull her off, proceeded to the landing and procured two lighters, which she towed along-side the bark. She then left for Charleston, and never came back. The bark, fearing a careen, put out four lines, which parted. The next afternoon, at high water, she got off with her own appliances, having been ashore 24 hours. She reached the landing, and discharged cargo. Neither the master of the bark nor his interpreter had ever been up the creek. 'rhe tug-master knew it well. This action is for damages sustained by reason of the negligence of the tug-master. The contract was between the Etiwan Company and the tug. The action is not on the contract. It proceeds upon the duty imposed by law upon the tug not to cause injury to her tow. The M. J. Cummings, 18 Fed. Rep. 178. The responsibility of a tug to her tow cannot be better expressed than in the language used by the supreme court in The Margaret, 94 U. S. 494: "The tug was not a common carrier; * * * she was not an insurer. The highest possible degree of skill and care were not required of her. She was bound to bring to the performance of the duty she assumed reasonable skill and care, and to exercise them in everything relating to the work until it was accomplished. * * * The tug was the dominant mind and will in the adventure. It was the duty of the brig to follow her guidance, to keep as far as possible in her wake, and to conform to her directions. The exercise of reasonable skill and care within this sphere was incumbent on the tow." That is to say, both the tug and the tow must exercise reasonable care and skill. The former dominates, guides, and directs. The latter follows her guidance, keeps in her wake, and conforms to her directions. When the tug and tow had rounded the bend, the former gave the order which changed the direction of the bark obliquely across the creek. She followed this direction, and kept it, notwithstanding that it carried her certainly into the bank. She could see that the tug h::A straightened her course parallel to the bank. She was under specific directions to follow in the wake of the tug. She was not a barge not manned, blindly following the impulse of the tow-line. She had an intelligent master, mate, and an experienced crew. She steered well. While the tug was bound to exercise reasonable skill and care, Ehe had the right to expect corresponding care and skill on the part of the tow. She was not bound to repeat positive orders; nor, when they were in the open creek, past the bends, was she bound to ex.ercise unnecessary vigilance to see that the tow was in her wake. The tow did not follow this direction. In consequence of her negligence in this regard she took the bank. The libel is dismissed.
IN RE NEAGL&
833
In re
NEAGLE.
(Circuit Court, N. D. California. 1.
September 16,1889.)
UNITED STATES COURTS-JURISDICTION-HABEAS CORPUS.
Under the provisions of sections 751-753, Hev, St.· the courts of the United States and their judges have jurisdiction; npon a writ of lwbea8 COrjJU8. to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment of the petitioner; and if, upon such inquiry. he is found to be "in cnstody for an act done or omitted, in pursuance of a law of the United States." he is entitled to be discharged, no matter from whom. or under what authority, the process under which he is held may have issued; the constitution. and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, being the 8upreme law of the land. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, there is no conflict of authority between the state and the United States, The laws of the United States being the supreme law ofthe land. the authority of the state, in such cases, is subordinate, and that of the United States paramount. A state law which contravenes a valid law of the United States is void. In legal coutemplation, there can no more be two valid conflicting laws. operating upon the same subject-matter, at the same time, than, in physics, two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time.
2.
SAME.
3.
CO:SSTI'l'UTIONAL LAW-STATE LAWS,
4.
SAME-LAWS OBSTRUCTING UNITED STATES OFFICER.
The United States is agovernment, with authority extending overthe whole territory of the Union, acting upon the states, and the people of the states. 'While limited in the number of its powers, it is, so far as its sovereignty extends, supreme. No state can exclude it from exercising those powers, obstruct its authorized officers, against its will. or withhold from it the cognizance of any subject which the constitution has committed to it. SAME.
5.
The constitution and laws of the United States, as to those matters wherein they are supreme, extend over every foot of the territories of the United States, and the jurisdiction of its courts to enforce rights derived thereunder is as extensive as the territory to which they are applicable. The national government has power to command obedience to its laws, to preserve order, and to keep the peace. in matters affecting national interests, and no person or powerin the land has a right to resist or question its authority, so long as it keeps within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
6.
SAME-RIGHT OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO PRESERVE ORDER.
7.
SAME-PROTECTION OF JUDGES.
It is within the power of the government of the United States to protect all the agencies and instrumentalities to accomplish the objects and purposes of that government. It is therefore empowered to protect the lives of the judges of its courts from assault and assassination, on account of their judicial decisions, by desperate. disappointed litigants. not only while actually holding court. but while such judges are traveling through their circuits for the purpose of holding courts at the different places therein appointed by law for that purpose. POWERS OF UNITED STATES MARSHAL.
8.
An assault upon, or an assassination of, It judge of the United States court, while engaged in any matter pertaining to his official duties. on account or by reason of his judicial decisions or action in performing his official duties, is a breach of the peace. affecting the authority and interests of the United States, and w.ithin the jurisdiction and power of the United States marshal or his deputies to prevent, as a peace-officer of the national government.
9.
By section 788, Rev. St., and the several provisions of the statutes of California prescribing the duties of sheriffs, by that section made applicable to
v.39Jf.no.15-53
