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← 39 F.3d 773 - John v. Resolution Trust Corp.

John v. Resolution Trust Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

39 F.3d 773 · 1994

Citation profile

27
cited by 27 later decisions
1
states following
November 2016
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently November 2016 · most notably Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank N.A. (1996), Brookside Associates v. Rifkin (1995)

10 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

160199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 12 U.S.C. § 1821 · 12 U.S.C. § 1823

Relies on D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance · Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance · Howell v. Continental Credit Corp. · James N. And Betty G. Bowen v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for First Republicbank--El Paso · Vernon v. Resolution Trust Corp.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Section 1823(e) requires an identifiable 'asset' which is acquired by the bank and then transferred to the regulatory agency, and to which the unenforceable agreements must relate.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(1) In general No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section or section 1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agreement— (A) is in writing, (B) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution, (C) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (D) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the depository institution. (2) Exemptions from contemporaneous execution requirement An agreement to provide for the lawful collateralization of— (A) deposits of, or other credit extension by, a Federal, State, or local governmental entity, or of any depositor referred to in section 1821(a)(2) of this title, including an agreement to provide collateral in lieu of a surety bond; (B) bankruptcy estate funds pursuant to section 345(b)(2) of Title 11; (C) extensions of credit, including any overdraft, from a Federal reserve bank or Federal home loan bank; or (D) one or more qualified financial contracts, as defined in section 1821(e)(8)(D) of this title, shall not be deemed invalid pu”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The common law D’Oench doctrine and its statutory counterparts are frequently analyzed together and likely serve identical aims (Justice Scalia relied on D’Oench in his analysis of the scope of § 1823(e) in Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 , 108 S.Ct. 396 , 98 L.Ed.2d 340 ). The two, however, may not be co-extensive.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.