¶1(dissenting). It seems to me that the first question to be determined in this case is whether the statute authorizing removals by the governor includes the president of a city commission among the officers subject to such removal. And I am frank to confess that I have not found.this question to be as simple or easy to solve as have some of my brethren. The great fundamental rule in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. This intention must first be sought in the words and language employed, and where the meaning of the language used is plain there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. And such language must be given effect by the courts, or they would be assuming legislative authority. 36 Cyc. 1106; Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 237. It is only where the language of a statute has a doubtful meaning, or where its provisions are contradictory, or where an adherence to the strict letter *453would lead to injustice or absurdity, that there is any room for judicial construction. 36 Cyc. 1107.
¶2The statute authorizing the governor to remove certain officers does not specifically enumerate the president of a city commission, and the question is whether the legislature intended to and did include such officer in the terms, “mayor” or “other police officers.” The statute in question was enacted by the legislative assembly in 1913. In the message of the retiring Governor Burke, delivered on January 8, 1913, he strongly recommended the enactment of such legislation. He called attention to the fact that each platform upon which he had been elected governor in 1908 and 1910 contained a plank in favor of such law, and that bills providing therefor had been introduced in the legislative sessions in 1907, 1909, and 1911. The reason urged by Governor Burke for the enactment of such Removal Statute was that the Oonstitution commanded the governor to enforce the laws of the state, and that the power to remove should be vested in the governor in order to enable him to carry out this constitutional command. In support of his argument, he referred to the power vested in the President of the United States and his duties under the Federal Oonstitution to see that “the other executive and administrative officers of the government faithfully perform their duties, which are prescribed by the statutes. See House Journal 1913, pp. 185-189. The law under consideration was enacted by the legislative assembly to which Governor Burke delivered this message. It was entitled “An Act Providing for the Removal of Oounty, Township, Municipal and Other Officers.” Laws 1913, chap. 132. The same legislative assembly, at the same session, and in fact on the same day, enacted another act “to provide for a means of removal of elective officers by the will of the people.” This law applied to and authorized the removal of “the holder of any elective office in cities which may adopt or have adopted the commission plan of government,” by the electors of such cities. Laws 1913, chap. 79.
¶3It is true, the adoption of this latter method of removal did not necessarily signify any intention on the part of the legislature that this method should be exclusive, as the legislature might, if it desired, provide two methods of removal. But the significant fact still remains that the legislature at the same time considered and enacted two laws for the removal of public officers. It considered not only the methods *454of removal to be employed, but the officers to which each of the methods of removal might be applied. It determined that certain officers should be subject to removal, and it enumerated such officers. As to one of the methods of removal, it specifically distinguished between the president of a city commission and the mayor of a city, by making the president-removable by a vote of the electors and withholding such method of removal as applied to a mayor. It is stated in the majority opinion that the reasons which actuated the legislature in enacting the measure authorizing the removal of elective officers in a city having the commission form of government by a vote of the electors was “that the commission form of government removed the city officers, in a measure, from the direct control of their wards and constituencies, and that the legislature feared that in certain instances such officers might adopt policies of government and legislation of which they might not approve.” This reason would apply equally and with even greater force to the mayor of a city, operating under the aldermanic form of government. Such mayor is elected by the electors of the city at large, and he has far greater power with respect to the administration of the city affiairs and the shaping of its governmental policies than has the president of a city commission.
¶4The laws of this state provide two different plans of city government. The first plan is the one generally adopted in this country. It is a complete copy in miniature of the government of the United States and of the state. The mayor is the chief executive officer, with no legislative power except that of veto. The city council constitutes the legislative department. The second plan is known as the commission plan. It originated in Galveston, Texas, after the great inundation in 1900. There are fundamental differences between the two systems. In discussing the two forms of city government, a well-known legal writer has said: “Its [the commission plan’s] essential feature is to center responsibility, and render the officers directly accountable to the people by providing fewer head officers; and its chief merit, as claimed by its advocates, is that it simplifies municipal administration. It usually incorporates the referendum, initiative, and the recall. The names of candidates for office, who are few, are arranged alphabetically on the ballot, and emblems or devises and party names are forbidden. The officers are elected at large, and do not represent wards or districts, but *455the entire local community. The work of municipal administration is apportioned among the commissioners (five is the usual number), each being the head of a department for which he is responsible. . . .
“The commission plan seems to have sprung from the conception that municipal government is merely a business question, and therefore it should be conducted in substantially the same manner as a large business corporation. That is, the conduct of the affairs of the local government should be assimilated as far as practical to the most efficiently managed private business. . . .
“Apart from the commission plan mentioned, the disposition to increase the powers of the mayor and thus center the responsibility upon this official appears to be the present idea in this country in municipal governmental development. The fundamental principle is that the office of mayor should be ‘clothed with dignity and real authority,’ and that he should have ample power to control fully the administration of all municipal affairs. In addition to the veto power, which is his chief agency in legislation, many thinkers and writers contend that he should have ‘the sole right to appoint and the unrestricted power to suspend or remove subordinate officials or heads of departments.’ . . .
“The idea of the autocratic mayor, which contemplates giving him all executive and administrative power and restricting the governing or legislative body, which may not be inaptly termed “the cure or kill remedy,” while objectionable in some respects, appears in the opinion of many to offer the best solution of the municipal problem touching the selection of officers and the centering of responsibility.” McQuillin, Mun. Corp. §§ 92, 93.
¶5Speaking of the commission plan, a-critical student of city government says: “The healthful kernel of this new movement is that it rests upon an abiding faith in the efficacy of public control. It places responsibility for good government exactly where it belongs, namely, on the people themselves, and makes necessary the development of a well-organized public, opinion.” Rowe, Problems of City Government, chap. 8, p. 190.
¶6A reference to our statutes will show the aptness of these observations. The mayor appoints all the appointive officers of the city, including the city auditor, city assessor, city attorney, and chief of police. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 3580-3612. He is also authorized to fill by *456appointment any vacancy existing in the office of city treasurer. § 3631. He is also empowered to remove any appointive officer. § 3570. The president of the city commission has no such powers. Hnder the commission plan, the government is divided into departments. Each commissioner is elected by a majority vote of the commissioners to take charge of one department. One commissioner is known as “police and fire commissioner,” and this commissioner has “under his special charge the enforcement of all police regulations of the city.” Comp. Laws 1913, § 3794. The appointive officers, including policemen, of the city, are selected, not by the president of the city commission, but by a vote of the commissioners. § 3801. The power to remove the appointive officers is vested not in the president of the city commission, but in the commissioners. Comp. Laws 1913, § 3808. The mayor of the city has power to veto ordinances and resolutions passed by the city council. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 3579-3596. The president of the commission has no right to veto. Comp. Laws 1913, § 3792.
¶7Considerable importance is attached by the majority members to § 3796, Comp. Laws 1913. This section provides: "Whenever the president of the hoard of city commissioners shall deem it necessary, in order to enforce the laws of the city, or to avert danger, or protect life or property, in case of a riot or any outbreak, or calamity or public disturbance, or when he has reason to fear any serious violation of a law or order or any outbreak, or any other danger to said city or the inhabitants thereof, he shall summon into service, as a special police force, all, or as many of the citizens as in his judgment and discretion may be necessary and proper; ...” This language speaks for itself. The powers conferred by this section upon the president of a city commission are for unusual occasions. It is interesting to note in this connection that the mayor of the city is authorized not only to call on the male inhabitants of the city to aid in enforcing the laws and ordinances, but may also call out the Militia to aid in suppressing riots or rather disorderly conduct, or to carry into effect any law or ordinance, subject only to the authority of the governor as commander in chief of the Militia. Comp. Laws 1913, § 3576. Manifestly § 3796 is not intended to and does not vest the president of the city commission with power to appoint policemen of the city except in cases of emergency, such as riot or other unusual disturbance, but *457the power to appoint police ordinarily necessary in the government of the city is expressly reserved to and conferred upon the city commissioners. Comp. Laws 1913, § 2801.
¶8Reference is also made in the majority opinion to §§ 3833 and 3834, Comp. Laws 1913. These sections were part of the act providing-for the commission form of city government. The act was entitled “An Act to Provide for a Commission Form of Government in Cities Which Shall Adopt the Provisions of This Act.” Manifestly many provisions, such as the levy of taxes and special assessments, and other statutory provisions relative to the administration of city affairs, would be equally applicable to either form of government. The existing statutes, however, referred to the “mayor”'and “city council.” Consequently, in order to avoid the necessity of • re-enacting these provisions as a part of the law providing for the commission form of government, or to avoid any doubt as to what provisions were applicable,, the legislature said: “Whenever, in the laws not repealed by this act, the words, 'town council, city council, or village board,’ appear, it shall mean board of city commissioners; the word 'mayor’ or 'president’ shall mean president of the board of city commissioners.” Whenever the words, “city commissioners,” are used in this chapter they shall be construed to mean and include “village commissioners.” Comp. Laws 1913, § 3833. And “all the provisions of law now in force- or which may hereafter be passed by the legislative assembly in relation to the powers, duties or privileges of the president of boards of trustees of towns or villages, or mayors of cities, 'are hereby granted to the-president of the board of city commissioners, and except where inapplicable all the provisions of law now in force or hereafter passed by the legislative assembly in relation to the powers, duties or privileges of town or village trustees, or other municipal boards thereof, or tiie powers, duties or privileges of city councils are hereby granted to the board of city commissioners. ...” Comp. Laws 1913, § 3834. The legislature in enacting these provisions obviously had in mind only-city government. The sole purpose of these sections was to make-applicable, as far as practicable, under the commission form of government, the general provisions of law applicable alike to both plans of city government. These provisions should be applied for the purpose intended. It should not be assumed that a subsequent legislature in*458■tended to wrench, them from their setting, and to apply them to a purpose wholly foreign to that for which they were enacted.
¶9It has been said that “it is generally safe to reject an interpretation that does not naturally suggest itself to the mind of the casual reader, but is rather the result of a laborious effort to extract from a statute .a meaning which it does not at first seem to convey.” Ardmore Coal Co. v. Bevil, 10 C. C. A. 41; 21 U. S. App. 96, 61 Fed. 151; Shultis v. MacDougal, 162 Fed. 331, 340. The majority opinion demonstrates quite clearly that the interpretation placed upon § 685, Comp. Laws 1913, is not one which “naturally suggests itself.” It is only by a laborious effort, and by applying terms contained in statutes passed by other legislative assemblies for wholly different purposes, that the majority is enabled to say that this section applies to the president'of a city commission.
¶10When we consider the fundamental differences between the two forms of city government; that the same legislature on the same day passed two removal measures; that one of those specifically authorized removal of a mayor by the governor, but was silent as to the president of a city commission, while the other expressly authorized the removal of the president of the city commission by the electors of the city, but did not authorize the removal of a mayor in this manner, — it seems to me that no one can say that the legislature intended to include the president of a city commission in the first removal measure.
¶11In view of what I have said, it is unnecessary for me to express any opinion on the constitutional questions raised. But inasmuch as the majority members have found it necessary to consider this question, I deem it proper to say that I am of the opinion that the Removal Statute under consideration is constitutional, I am not prepared, however, to concur in the discussion of the constitutional questions in the majority opinion. Whether the legislature has power to authorize "the removal of an elective officer by the governor without permitting such review is a question of grave importance and considerable doubt, and one upon which I express no opinion. The question is clearly not involved in this case, as the Removal Statute before us provides for a judicial review of all questions.
¶12Some reference is made in the majority opinion to § 130 of the .state Constitution, and it is intimated that this section confers upon *459the legislative powers with respect to municipal corporations which it would not otherwise possess. I believe this reasoning to be unsound.
¶13The section reads: “The legislative assembly shall provide by .general law for the organization of municipal corporations, restricting their powers as to levying taxes and assessments, borrowing money and contracting debts, and money raised by taxation, loan or assessment for any purpose shall not be diverted to any other purpose except by authority of law.”
¶14Manifestly this section does not confer upon the legislature any power or authority to deal with municipal corporations which it would not possess under the grant of legislative power. On the contrary it is rather a limitation upon the general grant of legislative power. It is a declaration of a constitutional policy with respect to the legislation relating to municipal corporations which the legislature is commanded to enact.
¶15No one doubts the legislative power by appropriate laws to create, dissolve, supervise, or direct the conduct of the affairs of municipal corporations. This power, however, is subject to the limitations found in the state and Federal Constitutions, and this court has not hesitated to adjudge invalid statutes relating to municipal corporations which violated the state Constitution.
¶16Thus, in Glaspell v. Jamestown, 11 N. D. 86, 88 N. W. 1023, this court held that it was beyond the power of the legislature to authorize proceedings for changing the boundaries of cities to be instituted in the district courts, for the reason that the power exercised in changing •such boundaries was legislative and consequently could not be vested in the courts. And in Plummer v. Borsheim, 8 N. D. 565, 80 N. W. 690, this court held invalid as an unreasonable and arbitrary classification a statute relating to the organization of school townships.
¶17(dissenting). This is an appeal from an order of the district court by Judge Cole, dismissing a writ restraining proceedings by the governor to remove W. S. Shaw from the office of president of the city commissioners of Minot. The defense is: (1) That the complaint does not state a cause for removal; (2) that the statute does not authorize a removal; (3) that the statute is not constitutional.
¶18The statute reads thus: The governor may remove from office any *460county commissioner, clerk of the district court, county judge, sheriff,, coroner, county auditor, county treasurer, superintendent of schools, surveyor, public administrator, mayor, chief of police, deputy sheriff' or other police officer, or any custodian of public moneys, except the-state treasurer, whenever it appears to him by complaint and evidence- and after hearing that such officer has been guilty of misconduct, malfeasance, crime in office, habitual drunkenness or gross incompetency. Laws 1913, chap. 132.
¶19The complaint is in effect that as president of the city commissioners, W. S. Shaw knowingly permitted to be kept numerous places in Minot,, where intoxicating liquors were sold and given away, and that he permitted bawdyhouses, gambling houses, to be kept within the city; that he is a member of the Elks Lodge and visited the place known as the-“Elks Home,” where people assembled for the purpose of drinking-intoxicating liquors, and that on many occasions he did there drink intoxicating liquors and participate with the club in the illegal sale-of intoxicating liquors.
¶20The same might be said of the mayor of St. Paul, Minneapolis, and nearly every other city. They all permit numerous things to be done-which they cannot well prevent. They belong to clubs and may innocently participate in the doings of the clubs. The Lord knowingly permits the doing of such things and still he has an absolute power to= prevent them. The clergy and some of the best men on earth do knowingly permit the doing of many things which by extra vigilance and. self-sacrifice they might prevent. No facts are stated to show that: Mr. Shaw is a bad or immoral man, or that he is a drunkard or that, he is incompetent, or that he is not the choice of the voters of Minot. So far as the record shows, were he removed from office to-day, to-morrow or in a few days the people of Minot might re-elect him. If his. recall is demanded by the citizens of Minot, they have a plain, speedy,, and adequate remedy. They have only to file with the city auditor a proper petition demanding a recall and the election of a successor. Then the board of city commissioners must fix a date for holding such election. The person subject to removal may be a candidate; and the-candidate receiving the highest number of votes is elected.
¶21Aside from all that, there is a regular judicial procedure by which an officer may be removed for crime or malfeasance in office. 2. The*461-second point is on tbe words of the statute, that the governor may remove any mayor, chief of police, deputy sheriff, or other police officer. It is contended that the president of the board is in reality a police officer, and that he comes within the spirit and reason of the act. The answer is that the statute is penal, and it must be given a strict construction so as to include only those who come within the letter of the act. If the legislature had intended to include city commissioners, the question should not have been left open to doubt or discussion. To have named them in the list of removable officers were as easy as to name the mayor and chief of police. But there was good reason for naming only such officers as are not subject to recall. Of course a city, or any person who employs men may reserve or be given the right to recall or discharge them.
¶22On the constitutional validity of the act, it is proper to consider what might be done under it or under similar acts. An office is property, it affords a living. It is an annuity. It is probable that the office in question gives an annuity of $1,000 a year. In some cities (not in this state) the head of a city commission is hired for his expertness and is paid from $5,000 to $10,000 a year. Now if a statute may authorize the governor or any other person in a summary manner to deprive any city commissioner of his annuity, why may he not in like manner under a similar statute deprive any person of his lands and possessions? Such was the power exercised by the great feudal lords. But now we have written constitutions, both state and Federal, which provide that no man shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. That includes and guarantees a hearing and a trial according to the law of the land and the established course of judicial procedure. By the constitution the judicial power of the state is vested in the courts. They alone are given jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of legal dispute regarding personal and property rights. When .a charge is made that a person is guilty of ■ misconduct in office and he denies the charge, then, to establish it and to deprive him of his office and his annuity, there must be a trial by some competent tribunal, the taking of testimony, deliberation, and determination. The tribunal must have jurisdiction, which means a right to speak and determine the law and the facts of the case.' This power is judicial. It. is given exclusively to the courts and it may not be given to the governor. *462To obviate this objection, the statute gives a half-way appeal to the-courts. It provides that when a party is accused, the governor may order a hearing before a referee, suspend the accused from his office, deny him his salary during the .hearing, and cause the vacancy in his office to-be filled by.an appointment. That the accused may appeal to any district court from the final decision of removal. That is not due process of law. A party may not be harassed or executed by a mock trial before he is legally tried and convicted.
¶23The case presents another feature which was considered in a case arising under a statute authorizing the governor to appoint a temperance commissioner to act in any county as a state’s attorney in the prosecution of liquor cases. The act was held void. The court said: The constitutional method of local administration of laws cannot be changed by the legislative assembly because they are of opinion that the local officers will not honestly administer such duties. In adopting the Constitution the people decided that the local officers will administer the law better than anyone else, and the legislative department is powerless to impeach their judgment. Ex parte Corliss, 16 N. D. 410, 114 N. W. 692.
¶24There is great wisdom in permitting those of the same community to manage their own local affairs. They grow in sympathy and mutual kindness. They observe the precept: “Bear ye one another’s burdens,” and they naturally resent interference from outsiders. It is sure to do more harm than good.
¶25The act is not constitutional. It does not authorize the removal of any city commissioner, and the complaint does not state facts showing a cause for removal.