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39 Ohio St. (N.S.) 661

Moore v. Given

Ohio Supreme Court

Decided January 15, 1884

Ohio Supreme Court · decided 1884-01-15

<p>1. It is the duty of courts in the interpretation of statutes, unless restrained hy the letter, to adopt that view which will avoid absurd consequences, injustice or great inconvenience, as none of these can he presumed to have been within the legislative intent.</p> <p>2. Where a statute requires notice of a proceeding, hut is silent concerning its form or manner of service, actual notice will alone satisfy such requirement.</p> <p>3. In a proceeding under “an act to regulate inclosures, and to provide against trespassing animals” (1 S. & 0., 649), as amended May 3, 1873 (70 Ohio L., 246), authorizing township trustees, after notice to all parties who may have any interest in the title or possession of premises affected hy a partition fence (and in the repair or construction of such fence), to proceed to view and assign to each party, for repair, his share of it, notice to a tenant in common in sole possession of such premises, who is alone interested in the possession of them, and in ■ the repair of such fence, is sufficient to invest the trustees with power to act.</p>

Relies on Mayor of Jeffersonville v. Weems · Henry v. Tilson

Decided 1884-01-15

Owen, J.

¶1Did notice to the defendant, he being the owner of an undivided interest of the lands actually occupied by him, invest the trustees with power to view and assign to each party, for repair, his share of the partition fence 2

¶2The defendant, by his demurrer, admitted that he received such form of notice as the law required ; that he was then and for twenty years previously had been in possession, claiming to be the owner of the land to be affected; that he was alone interested iu the possession of it; that he was alone interested in the construction and repair of the partition fence; that he was the only person known to the trustees and the community as the owner of the title; that he held himself out as the sole owner of the land, and that the owners of the residue of the title to it were persons whose residence was not within the State of Ohio, nor known to the plaintiff or the trustees.

¶3The contention of the defendant was and is, that all persons interested in the title of the lands occupied by him should have had notice of the proposed action of the trustees before they could have become invested with jurisdiction to act.

¶4The defendant was the sole occupant of the lands. He was, by his- own admission, the only person interested in the possession of it or in the repair of the fence. His co-tenants in common were beyond seas ; their residences unknown.

¶5As the form and manner of notice are not prescribed by the act, actual notice could alone satisfy its requirements.

¶6This would require of the plaintiff an impracticable, if not an impossible, thing.

¶7That the law does not require vain, absurd or impossible things of men is one of its favorite maxims; and it is the plain duty of the courts, in the interpretation of a statute, unless restrained by the rigid and inflexible letter of it, to lean most strongly to that view which will avoid absurd consequences, injustice and even great inconvenience; for none of these can be presumed to have been within the legislative intent. Rex v. Banbury, 1 Ad. & El. 136, 142; Commonwealth v. Loring, 8 Pick 370; Jeffersonville v. Weens, 5 Ind. 547; Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479; Putnam v. Langley, 11 Pick. *664490; Bishop on Written Laws, 82; Debolt v. Trust Co., 1 Ohio St. 365; Brigel v. Starbuck, 34 Ohio St. 285.

¶8In the case last cited, Okey, J., uses this language : “ Bnt where strict adherence to the mere letter of a remedial statute will manifestly lead to serious inconvenience, interruption and delay in the settlement of an estate, we may sometimes depart from it, and we are always justified in looking to the whole statute to ascertain in what sense the words were used.”

¶9If the defendant’s position is well chosen, and all persons interested in the title were required to bo notified, remainder-men, reversioners, mortgagees, execution creditors after levy, would be within the requirement of the act and require notice, though having no interest in the possession of the premises or the repair of the fence.

¶10Applying, the foregoing principles of construction, and looking to the entire act and the objects to be effected, we are not called upon to do violence either to the obvious legislative intent or to the letter of the act in order to give it an interpretation in entire accord with reason and the justice of the case.

¶11Section 2 of the act before us provides :

“ The respective owners, or lessees for one or more years, “ of lands which now are, or hereafter may be inclosed with “fences, shall keep up and maintain in good repair, all partition fences between their own and the next adjoining in- “ closures, in equal shares, so long as both parties continue “to occupy or improve the same.”

¶12This provision raises the plain implication, that the parties -occupying and improving for their own benefit the lands ■divided by a partition fence are they who are immediately ■concerned in its repair.

¶13Section 3 of the act provides for notice “ to all parties who may have any interest in the title or possession of said premises a,id the repair or construction of said fence?

¶14To entitle a party to notice it is not enough that he be interested in the title or possession of the premises; he must also be interested in the repair or construction of the fence.

¶15*665How the defendant came to be alone interested in the construction and repair of this partition fence does not appear. It is sufficient for us to know that he admits the fact to exist, and this leaves us at liberty to suppose that it is so by some arrangement between himself and his co-tenants in common. Notice to him was sufficient to authorize the trustees to act.

¶16The facts stated in the petition abundantly constituted a cause, of action, and there was error in sustaining the demurrer to it and rendering the judgments complained of. The judgments of the court of common pleas and of the district court are reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.

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