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39 Tenn. 160

Wood v. Thomas

Tennessee Supreme Court

Decided December 15, 1858

Tennessee Supreme Court · decided 1858-12-15

<p>1. Attachment. Verbal sale of real estate. Equitable interest. Creditor and debtor. A creditor can be on no higher ground than his debtor, in attaching equitable interests of the latter. And if the debtor has done any act, or entered into any agreement which would preclude him from asserting an equity that he once had, his creditor would, likewise, be precluded from so doing.</p> <p>2. Same. Same. Case in judgment A. and B. entered into an agreement for the sale and purchase of real estate. The contract was in parol. A. paid B. $200, and executed his notes for the remainder of the purchase money, B. verbally agreeing to make him a title to the land when the purchase money should be paid. Subsequent to this agreement, the trade between A. and B. was cancelled, and the land sold to 0., who refunded to A. the $200 paid by him, and executed his notes to B., in the place of the notes previously given by A., which notes were delivered up to A. After this latter agreement a creditor of A.’s attached his interest in the lar.d and the fund. It was held that A. had parted with his equitable interest both in the land and fund, and it could not be attached at the instance of his creditors.</p>

Decided 1858-12-15

WuictHT, J.,

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶2On the 15th of July, 1856, the complainant, Wm. B. Wood, who is a creditor of the defendant, John H. Thomas, filed his bill m the Chancery Court at Eranklin against said Thomas and Thomas J. Gray.

¶3The said Thomas, in the fall of the year 1855, had verbally purchased of said Gray a house and lot, in the town of Paytonsville, in Williamson county, for which he was to pay $400, to wit, $200 on the first of January, 1856, $100 on the first of August, 1856, and the remaining $100 on the first of January, 1857; and for *162which. Thomas executed his notes to Gray, who never gave Thomas any deed, title bond, or writing of any kind, as to the house and lot.

¶4A part of this purchase money, namely, the $200 due in January, 1856, had been paid by Thomas to Gray, and the object of the bill was to attach the interest of said Thomas in the house and lot, and in the $200 so paid Gray — the bill being framed in the alternative, so as to reach either the house and lot or the fund, and have the same applied in satisfaction of complainant’s debt.

¶5In May, 1856, prior to the filing of complainant’s bill, Thomas had, with the assent of Gray, verbally sold his interest in the house and lot to Isaac Seerest for $450 — of which sum he paid Thomas in cash, $250; and, as to the balance, he executed to Gray his two notes for $100 each, due the first of August, 1856, and first of January, 1857. These notes were accepted by Gray in lieu of Thomas’ notes, which were surrendered to him by Gray, who agreed to make the title to Seerest instead of Thomas, upon receiving payment of the two notes.

¶6All this took place prior to the -filing of complainant’s bill; and Gray, from thenceforward, held himself ready to make the title to Seerest as soon as he paid him, and had no claim on Thomas, who was let entirely out of the contract, and ceased all claim to the house and lot after the sale to Seerest.

¶7The Chancellor decreed that Thomas had no attachable interest, either in the house and lot or in the fund, and that Gray, having waived the want of a writing, *163and submitting to make Secrest a ■ title, should do so upon receiving of him the residue of the purchase money. _ .

¶8With this decree Secrest, Gray, and Thomas are satisfied, and do not appeal. Añ appeal is only taken by complainant, Wood.

¶9We think the Chancellor’s decree -was right, and affirm it.

¶10The complainant can be on no higher ground than John H. Thomas, his debtor. The latter had no claim or debt -whatever against Gray, and could, in no aspect of the case, have any, for he .had received back, of Secrest, all he had advanced. Neither had he any interest in this house and lot. How could he, if disposed, file a bill and assert any equity or claim to this property after what had taken place between him and Secrest ? And complainant can be no better off. But he asserts no claim, and denies expressly he has any interest.

¶11Even if Gray desired, (but he does not,) to abandon the contract with Secrest, and enforce the specified execution of the contract with Thomas, yet he could not do so against the will of Thomas. This could only be done by the voluntary consent ’ of ■ both parties. But here neither consents; but both aver that Secrest is entitled to the property, and express a wish that it be decreed him under the contract with him. And he also desires that this be done, and files a ■ bill for that purpose.

¶12How then can complainant interpose to prevent this? That he cannot is conclusively settled in the case of Sneed et al. v. Bradley et al., 4 Sneed, 301. See, also, Thacker v. Chambers et al. 5 Hum., 313.

¶13We affirm the decision, with costs.

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