¶1This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing the action entered after a general demurrer to the complaint had been sustained, and after appellant had elected to stand on his complaint.
¶2The material allegations of the complaint are that on the 26th day of June,- 1909, the respondent Weatherby was the *582owner and in possession of certain real property and a building tbereon on Washington Avenue, which is one of the principal business streets of Ogden City, Utah; that said building fronted on said street twenty feet and extended back into the block 132 feet; that on the day aforesaid all the respondents “were engaged in the construction of a certain areaway beneath said sidewalk in front of said building, which areaway was intended, as a part and parcel of the cellar beneath said building, and, for such purpose, the said defendants had opened in said sidewalk by removing the surface thereof an areaway of the width of said building and of the depth of about eight feet, and extending across the entire width of the sidewalk; that at the time of the injury hereinafter complained of the said defendants had carelessly and negligently failed to erect proper, or any, guards or means to prevent persons passing along said' sidewalk from falling into said area-way, and had negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to place any signs or warnings whatever, of the existence of said excavation, or areaway; that on or about the 26th day of June, 1909, the plaintiff, while walking along and over said sidewalk on said Washington avenue, failing to observe said excavation by reason of the fact that his attention was otherwise attracted and engaged as he was then looking in another direction, and not knowing or having reason to know of the existence of said areaway or excavation, fell into and to the bottom of said areaway or excavation in said sidewalk without his fault or negligence.” The only other allegations of the complaint relate to the injuries and consequent damages which it is alleged plaintiff sustained by reason of the fall.
¶3-.Does the.complaint state a cause of action? It is fundamental that, in order to state a good cause of action ..in any kind of a case, it must be made to appeal* from the face of the complaint, either by direct allegation or by necessary or unavoidable inference from the facts stated,
¶4When the action is in tort, and especially if it is grounded upon negligence, it must also be made to appear from the complaint that the act or omission which constitutes
¶5If a complaint is based upon contract, all that is necessary to state is the making of the contract, the obligation thereby assumed, and the breach. The contract in such a case contains the primary right of the plaintiff. In the
¶6In an action for negligence arising from an excavation or defect in a street which makes the street dangerous or unsafe for travel by those who have a lawful right of passage, it is not enough to state merely that an excavation of certain dimensions has been made in a public highway, that in making it the person negligently failed to place any signs or guards at or near the excavation, and that the plaintiff
¶7It is an axiom of the law that negligence is never presumed, and hence, in an action like the one a.t bar,, it must be affirmatively made to appear: (1) that the interference with a street makes it dangerous or unsafe for, passage;
¶8By the statement that it was the proximate cause we do not mean that it must be alleged in that specific form. What we do mean is that it must be made to appear that the negligence did cause the injuries complained of. Under
¶9We do not wish to be understood as holding that all the essential facts to which we have -referred must necessarily be alleged in direct and positive terms. If sufficient facts are alleged from which the inferences that the place
¶10These rules of pleading are elementary, and it is not deemed necessary to refer to more than a few of the many authorities which could be cited on this subject. In 3 Bates PL, etc., 2244, the rule is stated thus:
“Merely averring a defect and injury is not sufficient, unless tlie latter appears to have been the result of the former.”
¶11It is further said:
“So, if lack of barriers along the side of a walk is tbe neglect, it must be averred that plaintiff would not have-fallen had there been such guards.”
¶12In referring to this doctrine the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of Bodah v. Town of Deer Creek, 99 Wis. 511, 75 N. W. 76, says:
“As this court has often been called upon to say, the mere breach of a duty which one person owes to another respecting his personal safety and an injury to such other do not constitute actionable negligence. There is still needed the element that the breach of duty in a line of responsible causation was the cause which produced the injury, and the facts in that regard must be alleged in the complaint.”
¶13In City of Logansport v. Kihm, 159 Ind. 70, 64 N. E. 596, it is said:
“While the paragraph describes a specific defect in the street, arid alleges that the accident occurred by reason of that defect, it wholly fails to show that the defect in the street was the proximate cause of the accident and injury.”
¶14*586In City of Hammond v. Winslow, 33 Ind. App. 95, 70 N. E. 820, in referring to the question that it must appear from the complaint that the negligence was the proximate canse of the injury in question, Mr. Justice Robinson says:
“It is left altogether to inference that, if guards had been maintained along the side, she would not have fallen. Under a- number of rulings we think the complaint must be held insufficient.”
¶15If we now apply the rules of pleading as the same are stated above to the allegations of the complaint in this case, how can it be said that the complaint states a good cause of action ? Certainly no one can claim that it is stated in direct terms that the excavation was dangerous. - Let us assume that this fact can properly be inferred from the allegations concerning the place where the excavation was made and the dimensions thereof. After having assumed or inferred the dangerous condition, the question now arises as to whether the condition was such as to require either signs or guards at all times of the day and night. There is no direct allegation that either signs or guards were necessary; but whether they were or not must again be inferred'. In making these inferences we must, however, infer that the respondents were guilty of negligence. While it is true that negligence may be inferred from other facts as a rule of evidence, and such is often done, can it, however, with the same degree of liberality,, be inferred that negligence existed from other facts stated in a pleading ? In other words, when it appears from the pleading, as in the case at bar, that an excavation is being made, that the work is proceeding in the daytime and at the time the plaintiff fell into it, the question at once arises whether from the mere description of the excavation and the place where it is we may infer that it was so dangerous a place as to require the placing of signs or guards in broad daylight. Had the appellant in direct terms alleged that the excavation was dangerous in daytime, then we might infer that signs or guards were necessary, and that a failure to put any constituted negligence. The inference would thus at least be a natural, if not wholly an unavoidable, one. Assuming, how*587ever, far tbe purposes of tbis decision, that there are sufficient facts stated from which it may he inferred that the respondents were required to erect a sign to apprise passers-by of the danger, from what fact or facts alleged in the complaint can it be also inferred that the absence of a proper sign or signal of warning caused the appellant to fall into the excavation ? He alleges in positive terms that in approaching the excavation “he was then looking in another direction” from that in which the excavation was located.
¶16From this it unavoidably follows that the failure to erect a sign could not have been the cause of appellant’s falling into the excavation for the reason that even though
¶17It is important to keep in mind that an inference in a pleading takes the place of a positive allegation, and hence must naturally and necessarily arise out of some fact or facts positively stated. An inference in a pleading, therefore, is equivalent to a positive statement of an ultimate
¶18It is also contended that the demurrer was properly sustained upon the ground that the facts stated in the complaint show' that the appellant was guilty of negligence which caused or at least materially contributed to the injury complained of.
¶19In view that both associates of the writer are of the opinion that the complaint is not vulnerable upon that ground, their judgment is deferred to. Inasmuch as anything
¶20From what has been said it follows that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with costs to respondents. It is so ordered.
¶21(concurring).
¶22In concur in the judgment. The trial court sustained the general demurrer to the complaint for want of facts. As neither the demurrant was required to set forth in the general demurrer, nor the court in passing on it to state, the particulars wherein the complaint was wanting in facts, we have no means of knowing for what reason the court held the complaint insufficient, except from an inspection of the complaint itself. Counsel have told us that the court held the complaint bad because the averments thereof conclusively show the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. But neither the court nor the record tells us that. The coprt having sustained the general demurrer for want of facts in the complaint, the ruling must be upheld if the complaint for any good reason is wanting in essential facts, though the trial court did not give the best- or proper reason for its deficiency in such particular. I think the demurrer was properly sus*589tained on the ground of a want of sufficient allegations-to show that the alleged negligence of the defendant caused the injury. I do not think that the allegations of the complaint conclusively show the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. I am of the opinion, also, that sufficient facts are alleged to show that a duty was imposed on the defendants to use ordinary care to guard the excavation and to warn and protect pedestrians against the dangers attending it, and that the defendants had failed and neglected so to do. But it is not sufficiently-alleged that the charged negligence of the defendants — their failure to place guards or barriers or signs or other means of protection or warning about the excavation — caused the plaintiff to fall, or that, he, by reason- of such failure or negligence, was cast into- the excavation.- Hence there is a want of allegations that the alleged negligence caused the injury. What plaintiff alleged was, not that the alleged negligence of the defendants caused him to be thrown or east into the excavation, but that he “fell into” it “without his fault or negligence” because of his walking along the sidewalk and “failing to observe the excavation” for the reason that “his attention was otherwise attracted and engaged as he was then looking in another direction.” Such allegations, though they do not necessarily show the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, nevertheless do not sufficiently show that by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendants he fell or was cast into the excavation, and that the defendants’ negligence caused the injury.